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Privacy harms have become one of the largest impediments in privacy law 
enforcement. In most tort and contract cases, plaintiffs must establish that they 
have been harmed. Even when legislation does not require it, courts have taken 
it upon themselves to add a harm element. Harm is also a requirement to 
establish standing in federal court. In Spokeo v. Robins, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that courts can override Congress’s judgments about what harm should 
be cognizable and dismiss cases brought for privacy statute violations.  
The caselaw is an inconsistent, incoherent jumble, with no guiding 
principles. Countless privacy violations are not remedied or addressed on the 
grounds that there has been no cognizable harm. Courts conclude that many 
privacy violations, such as thwarted expectations, improper uses of data, and 
the wrongful transfer of data to other organizations, lack cognizable harm. 
Courts struggle with privacy harms because they often involve future uses 
of personal data that vary widely. When privacy violations do result in negative 
consequences, the effects are often small – frustration, aggravation, and 
inconvenience – and dispersed among a large number of people. When these 
minor harms are done at a vast scale by a large number of actors, they aggregate 
into more significant harms to people and society. But these harms do not fit 
well with existing judicial understandings of harm.  
This article makes two central contributions. The first is the construction of 
a road map for courts to understand harm so that privacy violations can be 
tackled and remedied in a meaningful way. Privacy harms consist of various 
different types, which to date have been recognized by courts in inconsistent 
ways. We set forth a typology of privacy harms that elucidates why certain types 
of privacy harms should be recognized as cognizable. The second contribution 
is providing an approach to when privacy harm should be required. In many 
cases, harm should not be required because it is irrelevant to the purpose of the 
lawsuit. Currently, much privacy litigations suffers from a misalignment of law 
enforcement goals and remedies. For example, existing methods of litigating 
privacy cases, such as class actions, often enrich lawyers but fail to achieve 
meaningful deterrence. Because the personal data of tens of millions of people 
could be involved, even small actual damages could put companies out of 
business without providing much of value to each individual. We contend that 
the law should be guided by the essential question: When and how should 
privacy regulation be enforced? We offer an approach that aligns enforcement 
goals with appropriate remedies. 
 
  





Harm has become one of the biggest challenges in privacy law.1 Law’s treatment 
of privacy harms is a jumbled, incoherent mess. Countless privacy violations are 
left unaddressed because courts refuse to recognize harm that has been suffered. 
As Ryan Calo has observed, “courts and some scholars require a showing of 
harm in privacy out of proportion with other areas of law.”2  
 
Privacy law in the United States is a sprawling patchwork of various types of 
law, from contract and tort to statutes and other bodies of law.3 As these laws 
are enforced, especially in the courts, harm requirements stand as a major 
impediment. When cases are dismissed due to the lack of harm, organizations 
engaging in wrongdoing escape without accountability. The message to other 
organizations is both clear and troubling—they can ignore privacy commitments 
enshrined in legislation and common law without concern.   
 
In several ways, harm emerges as a key gatekeeper in privacy cases. Harm is an 
element of many causes of action. Courts struggle to recognize privacy harms 
because they often do not produce tangible financial or physical harm.4 Instead, 
privacy harms often involve intangible injuries, which courts address 
inconsistently and with considerable disarray. Many privacy violations involve 
broken promises or thwarted expectations about how people’s data will be 
collected, used, and disclosed. The downstream consequences of these practices 
are often hard to determine in the here and now. People might be flooded with 
unwanted advertising or email spam. Their expectations may be betrayed, 
resulting in their data being shared with third parties that may use it in 
detrimental ways –but precisely when and how is unknown.  
 
For many privacy harms, the injury may appear small when viewed in isolation, 
such as the inconvenience of receiving an unwanted email or advertisement or 
the failure to honor your expectation that your data would not be shared with 
third parties. But when done by hundreds or thousands of companies, the harm 
adds up. Moreover, these small harms are dispersed among millions (and 
sometimes billions) of people. Over time, as numerous people are each 
 
1 Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 477, 508 (2010) 
(“Delineating remediable harms has been a challenge for law and policy makers since the early 
days of the Internet.”).  
2 Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 Colo. Tech. L.J. 361, 361 (2014); see also Ryan 
Calo, Privacy Law’s Indeterminacy, 20 Theoretical Inquiries L. 33, 48 (2019) (Courts “do not 
understand privacy loss as a cognizable injury, even as they recognize ephemeral harms in other 
contexts”).  
3 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (7th ed. 2021).  
4 Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 747, 798-99 (2016) (“For most courts, privacy and data security harms are too 
speculative and hypothetical, too based on subjective fears and anxieties, and not concrete and 
significant enough to warrant recognition.”).  
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inundated by a swarm of small harms, the overall societal impact can be 
significant. Yet, these types of injuries do not fit well into judicial conceptions 
of harm, which have an individualistic focus and heavily favor tangible physical 
and financial injuries that occur immediately.  
 
Some statutory laws recognize government agency or state attorney general 
enforcement that are less constrained by judicial conceptions of harm, but these 
enforcers have limited resources so can only bring a handful of actions each 
year.5 To fill the anticipated enforcement gap, legislators have often included 
statutory private rights of action. The financial rewards of litigating and winning 
cases work like a bounty system, encouraging private parties to enforce the law.6 
To address the difficulties in establishing privacy harms, several privacy statutes 
contain statutory damages provisions, which allow people to recover a minimum 
amount of money without having to prove harm.  
 
Courts, however, have wrought havoc on legislative plans for statutory damages 
in privacy cases by adding onerous harm requirements. In Doe v. Chao, for 
example, the Supreme Court held that a statutory damages provision under the 
federal Privacy Act of 1974 would only impose such damages if plaintiffs 
established “actual” damages.7 As a  second punch, the Supreme Court held in 
Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper that emotional distress alone was 
insufficient to establish actual damages under the Privacy Act.8 In a variation of 
this theme, in Senne v. Village of Palatine,9 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff had to prove harm to recover under a private 
right of action for a violation of the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act even 
though the provision lacked any harm requirement.  
 
Courts have also injected harm as a gatekeeper to the enforcement of the law 
through modern standing doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
plaintiffs cannot pursue cases in federal court unless they have suffered an 
“injury in fact.”10 Specifically, in the privacy law context, in 2016, the Supreme 
Court in Spokeo v. Robins, concluded in a case involving the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act that courts could deny standing to plaintiffs seeking to recover 
under private rights of action in statutes. The court stated that even if a 
legislature granted plaintiffs a right to recover without proving harm, courts 
 
5 Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General , 92 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 747, 799 (2016) (“Federal authorities cannot attend to most privacy and security 
problems because their resources are limited and their duties ever expanding. Simply put, federal 
agencies have too few resources and too many responsibilities.”) 
6 See Crabill v. Trans Union, LLC, 259 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that “[t]he award 
of statutory damages could also be thought a form of bounty system, and Congress is permitted 
to create legally enforceable bounty systems for assistance in enforcing federal laws.”).  
7 540 U.S. 614, 614 (2004). Id. at 614. 
8 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012). 
9 695 F.3d.597 (7th Cir. 2015).  
10 Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Sys. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).  
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could require a plaintiff to prove harm to establish standing.11 
 
Due to judicial intervention, the requirement of privacy harm is inescapable. 
Even when law does not require proof of harm, courts exert their will to add it 
in, turning the enforcement of privacy law into a far more complicated task than 
it should be. Privacy harm is a conceptual mess, obscured in a fog that 
significantly impedes U.S. privacy law from being effectively enforced. Even 
when organizations have engaged in clear wrongdoing, privacy harm 
requirements often result in cases being dismissed.   
 
In this Article, we clear away the fog so that privacy harms can be better 
understood and appropriately addressed.12 We set forth a typology that explains 
why particular harms should be legally cognizable. We show how concepts and 
doctrines in other areas of law can be applied in the context of privacy harms. 
 
A better understanding and recognition of privacy harms is only the first part of 
the equation. In addition to the issue of what should constitute cognizable 
privacy harm, we also examine the issue of when privacy harm should be 
required. In many cases, harm should not be required because it is irrelevant to 
the purpose of the lawsuit. The overarching question that the law should ask is: 
When and how should various privacy laws be enforced? This question brings 
into focus the underlying source of the law’s current malaise—the misalignment 
of enforcement goals and remedies. We propose an approach that aligns 
enforcement goals with appropriate remedies. 
 
This Article has four parts. Part I discusses when the law requires cognizable 
harm in order to enforce privacy regulation. Part II sets forth a typology of 
privacy harms, explaining why each involves an impairment of important 
interests, how law tackles them, and why the law should do so. Part III examines 
several challenges that make it difficult to recognize certain types of privacy 
harms. Part IV examines when privacy harm should be required in privacy 




11 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
12 Previously, we wrote an article about data breach harms. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats 
Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 737 (2018). We 
write separately on privacy harms because they are quite different. Data breach harms often 
involve either anxiety or a risk of future identity theft or fraud. Privacy harms are more varied 
than data breach harms and involve many other dimensions that pose challenges for the law.  
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I. COGNIZABLE HARMS: THE LEGAL  
RECOGNITION OF PRIVACY HARMS 
 
Requirements to establish harm serve as a major hurdle in privacy cases. Harms 
involve an injury, setback, loss, or impairment to well-being.13 They leave 
people or society worse off than before their occurrence. Frequently, 
establishing harm is a prerequisite to the enforcement for privacy violations in 
the judicial system. A cognizable harm is a harm that the law recognizes based 
on the law’s conception of harm.14  
 
Through harm requirements, courts have made the enforcement of privacy laws 
difficult, and, at times, impossible. They have added requirements for harm via 
standing. They have required harm for statutes that do not require such a 
showing. They have mandated proof of harm even for statutes that include 
statutory damages, undercutting the purpose of these provisions. They have 
adopted narrow conceptions of cognizable harm to exclude many types of harm, 
including emotional injury and dashed expectations. Because courts lack a 
theory of privacy harms or any guiding principles, they have made a mess of 





To pursue a lawsuit in federal court, a plaintiff must have standing. Standing is 
based on Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which states that courts are limited 
to hearing “cases” or “controversies.”15 In a series of cases starting in the second 
half of the Twentieth Century, the U.S. Supreme Court has placed harm at the 
center of standing.16 State courts generally do not require proof of standing.  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has developed a rather tortured body of standing 
doctrine, which is restrictive in its view of harm as well muddled and 
contradictory. Under contemporary standing doctrine, plaintiffs must allege an 
“injury in fact.”17 The injury must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual 
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”18 If a plaintiff lacks standing to 
bring a claim, a federal court cannot hear it. Two cases decided during the past 
 
13 A taxonomy of privacy developed by one of us focused on privacy problems. DANIEL J. 
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008). Problems are broader than harms. Problems are 
undesirable states of affairs. Harms are a subset of problems.   
14 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 34 (1984); see also 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 64 (1881, reissued 1963); Thomas C. Grey, 
Accidental Torts, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1225, 1272 (2001) (discussing Holmes’s harm-based 
approach). 
15 U.S. Const. Art. I.  
16 Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Sys. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).  
17 Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Sys. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).   
18 Id. 
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decade focused on privacy issues.  
 
In 2013, in Clapper v. Amnesty International,19 a group of lawyers, journalists, 
and activists challenged the constitutionality of surveillance by the National 
Security Agency (NSA). The plaintiffs contended that because they were 
communicating with foreign people who were likely to be considered suspicious 
by the NSA, they feared their communications would be wiretapped. The 
plaintiffs thus took measures to avoid the surveillance and maintain attorney-
client confidentiality, such as traveling in person to have client discussions.20 
The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to prove 
that they were actually under surveillance or that surveillance was “certainly 
impending.” The plaintiffs’ “speculation” about being under surveillance was 
insufficient.21 In a footnote, the Court noted that, “in some instances,” a 
“substantial risk that the harm will occur would be sufficient to confer standing 
to plaintiff.”22 The Court never explained what would constitute a “substantial 
risk.”  
 
Although Clapper has had a significant impact on data breach cases, a 
subsequent case has taken center stage for standing in privacy cases. In 2016, in 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Supreme Court attempted to elaborate on the types 
of harm that could be sufficient to establish standing.23 The Court focused on 
whether statutory violations involving personal data constituted harm sufficient 
to establish standing. The plaintiff alleged that Spokeo, a site supplying 
information about people’s backgrounds, violated the federal Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA) when it published incorrect data about him.24 Spokeo’s 
profiles were used by employers to investigate prospective hires, an activity 
regulated by the FCRA. The FCRA mandates that firms take reasonable steps to 
ensure the accuracy of data in people’s profiles.25 The plaintiff’s dossier was 
riddled with falsehoods, including that he was wealthy, married, had children, 
and worked in a professional field.26 According to the plaintiff, these errors hurt 
his employment chances by indicating that he was overqualified for positions he 
 
19 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
20 For a thoughtful analysis of Clapper, see Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 
Harv. L. Rev. 1934 (2013). 
21 The Clapper case comes with a dose of cruel irony. Although the government diminished the 
plaintiffs’ concerns about surveillance by arguing that the plaintiffs could not prove that they 
were subject to it, the government knew the answer all along, but because the pro gram was 
classified as a state secret, the plaintiffs did not and could not know for sure that they were being 
subject to surveillance. See Seth F. Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance:” Intangible Injury 
in Fact in the Information Age, 18 U Pa. J. Con. L. 745, 757 (2016).  
22 Id. at 1150 n.5. In Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, the Court, quoting Clapper, held that 
“an allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is certainly impending, or 
there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.” 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014). 
23 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
24 Id. at 1544. 
25 15 U.S.C. § 1681. 
26 Id. at 1546.  
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sought or that he might have difficulty relocating because he had a family.27  
 
Although the plaintiff properly sued under FCRA’s private right of action, 
according to the district court, the plaintiff lacked standing because he had not 
suffered an injury based on the erroneous information.28 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the statute resolved 
the question of whether a cognizable injury existed: FCRA explicitly allowed 
plaintiffs to sue for any violation of FCRA.29  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court took up the case, issuing an opinion purporting to 
clarify standing doctrine but instead creating significant confusion. Instead of 
deferring to Congress’s judgment for when plaintiffs could sue for violations of 
the FCRA, the Court added harm into the equation through standing. Reversing 
and remanding the case back to the Ninth Circuit, the Court explained that harm 
must be “concrete” and that “intangible harm” could be sufficient in some cases 
to establish injury.30 According to the Court, a “real risk of harm” could satisfy 
the concreteness because long-standing common law has “permitted recovery 
by certain tort victims even if their harms may be difficult to prove or 
measure.”31 The question would turn on “whether an alleged intangible harm 
has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as 
providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”32 Unfortunately, 
the common law invoked by the Court points in different directions. The Court’s 
discussion of “intangible harm” ended up creating confusion rather than clarity.  
 
The Court confounded matters in yet another way—it instructed courts to assess 
the judgment of Congress” to figure out “intangible harm constitutes injury in 
fact.”33 The Court began by noting:  
 
[W]e said in Lujan that Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally 
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously 
inadequate in law.’ Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in that case 
explained that ‘Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate 
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none 
existed before.’34  
 
Although Congress could independently define “concrete injury” in a way that 
enlarged the concept, the Court also said that Congress could deviate only so 
 
27 Id. at 1556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
28 Id.at 1546.  
29 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 411–14 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
See FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (willful violations), and 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (negligen t  
violations).  
30 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).  
31 Id. at 1549. 
32 Id. at 1549. 
33 Id. at 1549. 
34 Id. at 1549 (citations omitted).  





Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean 
that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement 
whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize 
that person to sue to vindicate that right. Article III standing requires a 
concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation. For that reason, 
Robins could not, for example, allege a bare procedural violation, divorced 
from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of 
Article III.35 
 
As to how far Congress could deviate from courts in defining injuries, the Court 
failed to provide a clear answer. As an example, the Court noted that courts could 
reject a “bare procedural violation” of a statute as an injury, but this example 
was muddled with further explanation: 
 
[T]he violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in 
some circumstances to constitute injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff 
in such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress 
has identified.36 
 
The Court thus said on one hand that a mere violation of a procedural 
right can be sufficient for concrete injury “without any additional harm.”  But, 
on the other hand, a “bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete 
harm” cannot constitute concrete harm. So, how are courts to distinguish 
between when a violation of a procedural right is a concrete injury and when it 
is not?   
 
The Court tried to explain its reasoning by noting that Congress passed the 
FCRA “to curb the dissemination of false information,” so bare procedural 
violations would not support standing if they did not operate to prevent such 
inaccuracies.37 The Court explained that consumers may not be able to sue a 
consumer reporting agency for failing to provide notice required by the statute 
if the information in their dossiers was accurate.38 The Court further complicated 
matters by stating that “not all inaccuracies cause harm or present any material 
risk of harm.” The example provided by the Court was an incorrect zip code. 
The Court explained, “It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an 
incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm.”39   
 
The Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to “examine whether the 
particular procedural violations alleged in this case entail a degree of risk 
 
35 Id. at 1549 
36 Id. at 1549 
37Id. at 1550. 
38 Id. at 1550. 
39Id. at 1550. 
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sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.”40 The Court noted that it was 
not taking a particular position about whether Robins properly alleged an injury.  
 
In the wake of Spokeo, courts have issued a contradictory mess of decisions 
regarding privacy harm and standing. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Robins 
had suffered harm, justifying standing.41 The court applied a test from the 
Second Circuit that assessed whether a statutory provision was designed to 
protect people’s concrete interests and whether those interests were at risk of 
harm in a particular case.42 Other courts have extracted a two-prong test from 
the wreckage of Spokeo, first looking to “historical inquiry” that “asks whether 
an intangible harm ‘has a close relationship’ to one that historically has provided 
a basis for a lawsuit,” and second, looking to a “congressional inquiry” that 
“acknowledges that Congress’s judgment is ‘instructive and important’ because 
that body ‘is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum 
Article III requirements.’”43 
 
Ultimately, no clear principles have emerged to guide the harm inquiry for 
standing in privacy cases. Rather than a circuit split or other clear disagreement 
in approach, what we have is a mess. Under the post-Spokeo jurisprudence, it is 
unclear how courts are assessing intangible injuries in privacy cases. On the 
whole, decisions take a stab by grasping at inconsistent parts of Spokeo.44  
 
Predictably, courts are reaching opposing conclusions as to the very same or 
similar FCRA violations. In Dutta v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that violating FCRA by failing to provide the plaintiff 
with a copy of his credit report before disqualifying him from the hiring process 
was not a harm. The court concluded that the plaintiff was not harmed because 
he was disqualified by the correct information in the credit report.45 By contrast, 
in Long v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, the Third  
Circuit denied standing to a plaintiff suing under FCRA for not being provided 
with his background check before being rejected for a job.46 
 
As the Third Circuit stated in another case involving a FCRA violation: “In some 
cases, we have appeared to reject the idea that the violation of a statute can, by 
itself, cause an injury sufficient for purposes of Article III standing. But we have 
also accepted the argument, in some circumstances, that the breach of a statute 
is enough to cause a cognizable injury — even without economic or other 
 
40 Id. at 1550.  
41 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 931 (2018). 
42 Id. at 1113 (citing Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 190 (2d Cir. 2016).  
43 Long v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 321 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Spokeo). 
44 Jackson Erpenbach, Note, A Post-Spokeo Taxonomy of Intangible Harms, 118 Mich. L. Rev. 
471, 483 (2019) (Spokeo has affected consumer protection laws unevenly. For example, while it 
risks extinguishing claims arising under FACTA, claims under TCPA are virtually 
unimpeded.”).  
45 Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2018). 
46 Long v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 316-17 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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tangible harm.”47 As the Sixth Circuit declared when it dismissed a case for lack 
of standing: “It’s difficult, we recognize, to identify the line between what 
Congress may, and may not, do in creating an ‘injury in fact.’ Put five smart  
lawyers in a room, and it won’t take long to appreciate the difficulty of the task 
at hand.”48   
 
B. HARM IN CAUSES OF ACTION 
 
For plaintiffs in federal court, standing is just the first harm hurdle. The second 
is showing harm as an element of claims alleged in the lawsuit.  In state courts, 
where there is no standing requirement, most causes of action have harm as one 
of the elements. Different types of causes of action recognize cognizable harm 
differently.   
 
1. Contract Law 
 
Contract law might seem to be a relevant body of law to regulate many privacy 
issues, as many privacy violations involve organizations breaking promises 
made in privacy policies. These policies could be deemed to be contracts or at 
the least subject to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. But, on the main, courts 
have been reluctant to recognize privacy policies as contracts.49  
 
Even if privacy policies were contracts, the plaintiffs would still lose due to the 
absence of cognizable harm.50 Under contract law, courts typically will not 
recognize harm without proof of economic loss. Failing to fulfill promises made 
in privacy policies and thus betraying people’s expectations has been 
insufficient to constitute a cognizable harm.51 For example, in Smith v. Trusted 
Universal Standards In Elec. Transactions, Inc., the court stated that plaintiff 
must “plead loss flowing from the breach [of contract] to sustain a claim.”52 In 
 
47 In re Horizon Healthcare Data Breach, 846 F.3d 625, 635 (3d Cir. 2017). 
48 Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 2018). 
49 Courts have decided surprisingly few cases involving contract law theories for privacy notices. 
Of those cases, few have held that privacy policies amount to enforceable contracts. A group of 
academics published an empirical analysis of cases and concluded that many courts were holding 
that privacy notices were contracts. See Oren Bar-Gill et al., Searching for the Common Law: 
The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer Contracts , 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 7 
(2017). These academics used their study as part of their project with the American Law 
Institute, the Restatement of Consumer Contract Law. However, Gregory Klass critiqued the 
study, finding that the case holdings were incorrectly evaluated, treating issues in dicta or not 
addressed as definitive holdings.  Klass found “little support” for any “trend towards contractual 
enforcement of privacy notices.’” Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the 
Restatement of Consumer Contract Law, 36 Yale J. on Reg. 45-115 (2019). A subsequent 
analysis of the Bar-Gill study sided with Klass. Adam J. Levitin et. al., The Faulty Foundation 
of the Draft Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 36 Yale J. on Reg. 447 (2019). 
50 See infra text accompanying notes. 
51 Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 Hastings L.J. 877, 881-84, 
892-3 (2003). 
52 Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards In Elec. Transactions, Inc., 2010 WL 1799456 (D.N.J. 
May 4, 2010). 
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Rudgayzer v. Yahoo! Inc., the court held that “[m]ere disclosure” of personal 
information “without a showing of actual harm” is “insufficient to support a 
claim of breach of contract.”53 In In re Facebook Privacy Litigation, the court 
rejected plaintiffs’ theory they suffered “appreciable and actual damage” in a 
suit for breach of contract.”54  
 
2. Tort Law 
 
Most tort claims require that plaintiffs establish harm. As tort law developed in 
the nineteenth century, a lively debate centered on whether tort law concerned 
the recognition of wrongs or, alternatively, the redress of harms. In The Common 
Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that tort law provided remedies for 
activities “not because they are wrong, but because they are harms.’55 Modern 
tort law has embraced the Holmesian approach.56  
 
The privacy torts grew out of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s influential 
article in 1890, The Right to Privacy.57 For students of their famous article, that 
result is odd given its rights-based focus on interferences with “individuals’ 
ability to develop their ‘inviolate’ personalities without unwanted 
interference.”58 The judicial development of the privacy torts can be attributed 
to William Prosser, the leading torts scholar of the 20th century, who played an 
enormous role in mainstreaming and legitimizing the privacy torts.59  
 
Prosser made the turn to harm explicitly and clearly, and courts followed suit. 
In 1960, in an article entitled Privacy, Prosser summed up a scattered body of 
caselaw to identify four torts: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion; (2) 
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity 
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; (4) appropriation, for 
the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.60 As reporter on 
the influential American Law Institute’s (ALI) Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
Prosser added the four categories of privacy torts to the Restatement.61 Prosser 
followed the Holmesian harms-based approach in constructing the privacy 
 
53 Rudgayzer v. Yahoo! Inc., 5:12-CV-01399 EJD, 2012 WL 5471149 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012), 
appeal dismissed (Dec. 13, 2012) (internal quotations omitted).  
54 In re Facebook Privacy Litigation, C 10-02389 JW, 2011 WL 6176208 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 
2011). 
55 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 144 (1881).  
56 There is a robust and important literature on tort law as the recognition of wrongs. See JOHN 
C.P GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS (2020). 
57 Samuel L. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). 
58 Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1805, 1820 (2010) 
(quoting Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy).  
59 Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1805 (2010); Neil M. 
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 Cal. L. Rev.  1887 
(2010). 
60 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
61 Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 Cal. L. 
Rev.  1887 (2010).  
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torts.62After Prosser’s article and the Restatement, courts readily embraced the 
privacy torts.63 Although Prosser strengthened the privacy torts, his work 
ossified them.64 No new privacy torts were created in the years following 
Prosser’s shining the spotlight on them.   
 
Today, nearly all states recognize most of the privacy torts.65 Courts rarely 
question the existence of harm or the fact that the basis of harm for many privacy 
torts is pure emotional distress. They tend to presume the existence of harm.66 
And yet while the privacy torts handily address the privacy problems of Warren 
and Brandeis’s time, such as invasions of privacy by the media, this is not the 
case for modern privacy problems involving the collection, use, and disclosure 
of personal data. Because courts cling rigidly to the elements of the privacy torts 
as set forth in the Restatement, the privacy torts have little application to 
contemporary privacy issues.67 
 
Other mainstream torts have been invoked to address privacy issues, such as 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of confidentiality, and 
negligence. These torts are often limited by harm requirements, making it 
difficult for plaintiffs to obtain redress. For example, the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress tort requires proof of “severe emotional distress,” which can 
be difficult to establish.68  
 
3. Statutory Causes of Action 
 
Many state and federal privacy statutes provide for private rights of action.  
Typically, the assumption is that a private right of action is a legislative 
recognition of harm, though there is no rule or doctrine that commands that all 
private rights of action in statutes are adopted to redress harm. Some might be 
there to facilitate private enforcement of a law or to deter violations.  
 
 
62 Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, supra, at 1821-24.  
63 Richards & Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law, supre note X, at 1903. 
64 Id. at 1904-07; G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY: AN INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY (1980). 
65 Richards & Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law, supre note X, at 1904 
66 Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note X, at 768-70.  
67 Citron, State Attorneys General, supra note X, at 798 (“Overly narrow interpretations of the 
privacy torts--intrusion on seclusion, public disclosure of private fact, false light, and 
misappropriation of image--have prevented their ability to redress data harms.”).  
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (liability for “[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous 
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another”). This tort was 
of particular interest to Prosser, who wrote a key article about it in 1939. William Prosser, 
Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort , 39 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939). In the first 
edition of his treatise on tort law, published in 1941, Prosser noted that “the law has been slow 
to accept the interest in peace of mind as entitled to independent legal protection, even against 
intentional invasions.  It has not been until recent years that there has been any gen eral admission 
that the infliction of mental distress, standing alone, may serve as the basis for an action, apart 
from any other tort.  
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Countless federal and state privacy laws have private rights of action. At the 
federal level, notable laws with private rights of action include the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA), the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FCRA), the Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA), among others.69 
At the state level, the California Consumer Privacy Act has a private right of 
action, but only for data security breaches.70  Several state unfair and deceptive 
acts and practices laws (called “UDAP” laws) have private rights of action.71 
The Illinois Biometric Privacy Act (BIPA) also has a private right of action.72  
 
Congress has recognized statutory damages for these private rights.73 Under the 
FCRA (the federal law at issue in Spokeo),74 any person who willfully violates 
“any requirement” in the statute is liable to in an amount equal to the sum of 
damages sustained by the consumer or “damages of not less than $100 and not 
more than $1,000.”75 There is no harm requirement in the Wiretap Act, the 
Stored Communications Act, the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, the Video 
Privacy Protection Act, and the Cable Communications Policy Act.76  
 
The Supreme Court has complicated recovery under these private rights of 
action by forcing plaintiffs to prove harm even though the statutes provide for 
statutory damages. For example, the Supreme Court has made recovery of 
damages under the federal Privacy Act exceedingly difficult.  In Doe v. Chao,77 
the U.S. Department of Labor improperly disclosed the Social Security Numbers 
 
69 Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), Pub. L. No. 102-243, 47 U.S.C. § 277(c)(5); 
Electronic Communications Priva cy Act (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 18 U.S.C. §2520 (Wiretap 
Act), §2707 (Stored Communications Act); Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), Pub. L. No. 
100-618, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c); Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Pub. L. No. 90-32, 15 U.S.C. 
§1681n (willful violations) and §1681o (negligent violations), Cable Communications Policy 
Act (CCPA), Pub. L. No. 98-549, 47 U.S.C. §,551(f). For a more complete list of federal laws 
with private rights of action, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW 
FUNDAMENTALS 160-61 (2019).  
70 California Consumer Privacy Act of 1018, AB 375. 
71 Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General , supra note, at 798. Many UDAP 
laws require or have been interpreted to require a showing of injury. Almost half of state UDAP 
laws restrict claims for intangible injuries. See Carolyn Carter, Consumer Protection in the 
States: A 50-State Evaluation of Unfair and Deceptive Practices Law 2, 40 (2018) 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udap-report.pdf.  
72 Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/1.  
73 The meaning of a private right of action with statutory damages is debatable. Is a private right 
of action a recognition of harm, with the statutory damages being imposed because harm can be 
difficult for plaintiffs to establish? Or is the purpose of the statutory damages to enable recovery 
in the absence of any harm because of other goals? Either way, the presence of statutory damages 
means that courts do not have to hold bench or jury trials on the question of recovery —
lawmakers have supplied their judgment as to the appropriate extent of redress.  
74 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. 
75 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). 
76 Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522; Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2709; 
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721- 2725; Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2710-2712; Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. §§521-573 
77 Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004).  
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of people filing for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. A group of 
plaintiffs sued under the Privacy Act. The lead plaintiff stated that he was “torn 
. . . all to pieces” by the disclosure and was “greatly concerned and worried.”78 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the statutory damages provision under the 
Privacy Act was only available if plaintiffs established actual damages.79  
 
In a subsequent case, Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper,80 the Supreme 
Court held that emotional distress alone could not amount to actual damages 
under the Privacy Act. Three justices, writing in dissent, argued that Congress 
passed the Privacy Act to protect against “substantial harm” that included 
“embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual.”81 The result 
of the Court’s holding was that a “federal agency could intentionally or willfully 
forgo establishing safeguards to protect against embarrassment and no 
successful private action could be taken against it for the harm Congress 
identified.”82   
 
The overall effect of Doe v. Chao and FAA v. Cooper has been to drastically 
limit the enforcement of the Privacy Act through private rights of action. 
Plaintiffs now have to prove willful conduct as well as establish harm, and they 
are forbidden from using emotional distress to do so, which is the predominant 
type of harm in privacy cases. Congress created the private right of action with 
statutory damages as an enforcement mechanism in the law, but the Court 
effectively cancelled it. The Privacy Act now hardly has any meaningful 
enforcement. 
 
Even when federal statutes do not mention having to prove damages, some 
courts have taken it upon themselves to add a requirement of harm. Consider 
Senne v. Village of Palatine.83 In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff could not pursue a private cause of action 
for a violation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) because plaintiff 
could not demonstrate injury. The Village of Palatine had a practice of including 
identifying information, such as people’s height and weight, on parking tickets 
placed under their windshield wipers. Although the Village’s practice was a 
clear DPPA violation, the court concluded that “we need to balance the utility 
(present or prospective) of the personal information on a parking ticket against 
the potential harm.”84 The court acknowledged that “the Act does not state that 
a permissible use can be offset by the danger that the use will result in a crime 
 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 614; see Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 Colo. Tech. L. J. 361 (2014) 
(discussing the Court’s refusal to recognize emotional harm as a basis for statutory damages 
under Privacy Act). 
80 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012). 
81 Id. (Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Bryer, J., dissenting) (quoting 5. U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10)).  
82 Id. 
83 Senne v. Village of Palatine, 784 F.3d.444 (7th Cir. 2015). 
84 Id. at 447.  
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or tort,” yet created a harm requirement anyway.85 The court struck down the 
right to sue under DPPA because plaintiff failed to provide evidence of harm, 
such as “stalking or any other crime (such as identity theft),” “tort (such as 
invasion of privacy),” disclosure over the Internet, or that “highly sensitive 
information” like social security number was involved.86  
 
Through interpretations like these, coupled with standing, courts are 
undercutting the enforcement of privacy laws by creating harm requirements out 
of whole cloth. Courts are generally supposed to be deferential to the legislative 
policy goals, striking down laws only when they traduce a constitutional 
boundary or infringe upon a right. But courts are trading deference for activism, 
undermining laws in an underhanded way. Harm requirements are being 
invented to prevent the enforcement of privacy protections.  
 
To sum up, courts have blocked statutory private rights of action by: (1) adding 
a requirement for harm via standing; (2) interpreting statutes with statutory 
damages in ways that require proof of harm to obtain statutory damages, thus 
undercutting the purpose of statutory damages provisions; (3) interpreting 
statutory private rights of action to require harm even when they do not have a 
harm requirement; and (4) adopting narrow conceptions of cognizable harm to 
exclude many types of harm.   
 
The enforcement of privacy laws is a challenging issue, and unfortunately, 
courts are making a mess of things. Courts often lack a theory of privacy harms 
or any guiding principles. As Lauren Scholz observes, in many cases, the 
“analysis as to why a harm is not present is often superficial or absent.”87 
Decisions involving harm lack a coherent vision; they are creating mischief  
rather than good policy. 
  
C. HARM IN REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
 
Regulators are often much less constrained by harm requirements. In many 
cases, the laws that they enforce do not require harm. The enforcement of 
statutes by regulators often occurs outside of the judicial system, so the issue of 
harm never arises.  
 
There are circumstances where harm is a requirement for regulators to enforce, 
most notably Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement of “unfair” acts or 
practices. Since the mid-1990s, the FTC has used its enforcement power under 
Section 5 of the FTC Act to address privacy issues.88 Section 5 of the FTC Act 
 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 448.  
87 Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 Ind. L.J. 653, 662-63 (2019) 
88 See Marcia Hofmann, The Federal Trade Commission’s Enforcement of Privacy , PROSKAUER 
ON PRIVACY (2012). 
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prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”89 A  
“deceptive” act or practice is a “material representation, omission or practices 
that is likely to mislead a consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to 
the consumer’s detriment.”90 There is no mention of harm in this definition, 
though it does indicate that the deception must be to the “detriment” of the 
consumer.  
 
The definition of unfairness is much more directly focused on harm. An “unfair” 
act or practice is one that “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”91 This 
definition explicitly includes “likely” harm. The FTC recognizes traditional 
harms (and risks of such harms) such as economic and physical harms, but “more 
subjective types of harm” such as emotional harm are usually not considered 
substantial for unfairness purposes.92 On the other hand, the FTC is able to focus 
on harm to consumers generally, which allows it to look to harm in a broader 
manner than most tort and contracts cases, which involve specific individuals.   
 
Although regulators are able to enforce less constrained by harm, they are often 
limited in resources and must be highly selective about the matters they 
enforce.93 State attorneys general vary considerably on how actively they 
enforce; some are aggressive whereas others have not brought any enforcement 
actions under many privacy laws that they are authorized to enforce.94 
 
Because of these limitations, many privacy laws rely upon private litigation to 
enforce the law. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) is a prime 
example of this type of enforcement mechanism. The law restricts unsolicited 
commercial telemarketing calls, robocalls, and faxes, and it is enforced by the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and state attorneys general. To 
augment this enforcement, the law includes a private right of action with 
statutory damages of $500 for each violation and $1500 for each knowing or 
willful violation.95 Because the TCPA enforcement process is tedious and time-
 
89 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
90 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); See Federal Trade Commission, Policy Statement on Deception (1983), 
appended to In re Cliffdale Assoc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm.  
91 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); Federal Trade Commission, Policy Statement on Unfairness (1980), 
Appended to International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm. 
92 Federal Trade Commission, Policy Statement on Unfairness  (1980), Appended to 
International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm; Marcia Hofmann, The Federal Trade 
Commission’s Enforcement of Privacy, PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY, at 2. 
93 Citron, State Attorneys General, supra note X, at 799.  
94 Id. at 755 (“In the past fifteen years, a  core group of states have taken the lead on privacy 
enforcement: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Washington.”).   
95 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5).  
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consuming and because many TCPA cases involve small matters that do not 
make splashy headlines, FCC enforcement has been modest.96 In one year, for 
example, there were 47,704 complains but the FCC only issued 23 citations.97 
In practice, private litigation has become the primary source of TCPA 
enforcement.98 
 
Litigation by private parties thus supplements enforcement by regulatory 
agencies and state attorneys general, and in a number of instances, private 
litigation serves as the primary enforcement mechanism of a law. Based on this 
enforcement role, private parties enforcing a law through private litigation are 
often referred to as “private attorneys general.”99 As one court aptly explained, 
the “award of statutory damages could also be thought a form of bounty system, 
and Congress is permitted to create legally enforceable bounty systems for 
assistance in enforcing federal laws, provided the bounty is a reward for 
redressing an injury of some sort (though not necessarily an injury to the bounty 
hunter).”100 And, these cases typically require a showing a harm, which is often 
the death knell if plaintiffs cannot show financial or physical harm. 
 
II. A TYPOLOGY OF PRIVACY HARMS 
 
Privacy harms have been a challenge to conceptualize because they are so 
varied. Privacy is an umbrella concept that encompasses different yet related 
things.101 It is no surprise that privacy harms involve different yet related 
concerns. Privacy harms not only differ in type but also in their severity. 
 
In this Part, we discuss the various types of privacy harms and whether the law 
currently recognizes them.102 For many types of privacy harm, the law lacks 
clarity and consistency as to whether the harm is cognizable.  We contend that 
in most cases, these distinct types of harms should be treated as cognizable 
harms. For several of these types of harms, there is support in caselaw and 




96 Spencer Weber Waller, Daniel B. Heidtke, and Jessica Stewart, The Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991: Adapting Consumer Protection to Changing Technology , 26 Loyola 
Consumer L. Rev. 343, 376-78 (2014) 
97 Id. at 378.  
98 Id. at 376 (“Private parties have largely been responsible for enforcement of the TCPA.”).  
99 William B. Rubenstein, On What A "Private Attorney General" Is--And Why It Matters, 57 
Vand. L. Rev. 2129 (2004). 
100 Crabill v. Trans Union, LLC, 259 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2001). 
101 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008).  
102 The typology of privacy harms differs from the taxonomy of privacy problems that one of us 
has developed. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008). The taxonomy 
concerns the concept of privacy, which involves attempts to deal with a set of related problems. 
Many of the problems in the taxonomy can create the same type of privacy harm. 
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A. PHYSICAL HARMS 
 
Privacy violations can create physical harms, which are well-recognized as 
cognizable under the law. Indeed, setbacks to physical health, where clear and 
obvious, have rarely been disputed as cognizable harms. 
 
The improper sharing of personal data can create unique opportunities for 
physical violence. Rebecca Schaeffer, a model and actress, was murdered after 
a stalker obtained her home address with the help of a private investigator who 
obtained it from California motor vehicles records. The Internet has made it even 
easier for such sharing of personal data to lead to physical assault. In December 
2009, an online advertisement on Craigslist featured a woman’s photograph next 
to her “interest” in “a real aggressive man with no concern for women.” The 
woman’s ex-boyfriend Jebidiah Stipe wrote the post.103 More than 160 people 
responded to the ad, including Ty McDowell.104 Stipe sent McDowell text 
messages with the woman’s home address and false claims of her fantasies about 
“humiliation, physical abuse, and sexual abuse.” McDowell attacked the woman 
as she returned home, forcing his way inside. At knifepoint, he raped her and 
abused her with a knife sharpener.105 When caught by the police, McDowell said 
that the woman had asked him to rape her.106 
 
Entities handling personal data have been found liable for negligently, 
knowingly, or purposefully paving the way for a third party to physically injure 
someone. In Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc.,107 a disturbed man named Liam 
Youens purchased personal data about Amy Boyer from data broker 
Docusearch.108 To satisfy Youens’s request for the address of Boyer’s employer, 
Docusearch hired a person to find out by calling Boyer, lying to her about the 
reason for the call and inducing her to reveal the address.109 Docusearch gave 
the address to Youens who then confronted Boyer at work and killed her.110  
 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the broker had a duty to exercise 
 
103 Brian, “Craigslist Rapists Get 60 to Life: Ad Seeking Someone with ‘No Regard’ for Women 
Led to Rape,” Victimized over the AOC (blog), July 3, 2010, 
http://victimsover18.blogspot.com/2010/07/craigslist-rapists-get-60-to-life-ad.html. 
104 William Browning, “Wyo. Craigslist Rape Victim Speaks for the First Time,” AP Alert, 
September 24, 2010. 
105 William Browning, “Details Emerge in Web Rape Case,” Star-Tribune (WY), February 5, 
2010, http://trib.com/news/local/article_edb73077-0bbc-5bc2-b9ea-b3fe5c9aedce.html; Pete 
Kotz, “Jebidiah Stipe Used Craigslist Rape Fantasy Ad to Get Revenge on Ex Girlfriend,” True 
Crime Report (blog), February 9, 2010 (11:13 A.M.), 
http://www.truecrimereport.com/2010/02/jebidiah_stipe_used_craigslist.php. 
106 DeeDee Correll, “Craigslist Implicated in Rape Case: A Wyoming Man Is Accused of Using 
the Website to Engineer an Ex-Girlfriend’s Assault,” Los Angeles Times, January 11, 2010, A9. 
107 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003). 
108 Id. at 1005-06. 
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
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reasonable care in releasing information to a third party due to the foreseeable 
risk of criminal conduct. A private investigator “owes a duty to exercise 
reasonable care not to subject a third person to an unreasonable risk of harm.”111 
For the court, the risk of criminal misconduct was sufficiently foreseeable so 
that an “investigator has a duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing a third 
person’s personal information to a client.” According to the court, information 
brokers should know that stalkers often use their services to obtain personal data 
about victims. 
 
Privacy claims involving the negligent enablement of physical injuries can be 
traced to premises liability cases. In Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue 
Apartment Corp.,112 the plaintiff was attacked and robbed in the hallway just 
outside her apartment. The landlord left the building unguarded even though 
tenants had been assaulted and robbed in the building’s common areas.113 The 
court held that residential apartment owners had a duty to exercise reasonable 
care to protect tenants from third party violence.114 The landlord was in a better 
position than the tenant to adopt precautionary measures and better situated than 
the police to diminish the risk of criminal assault on its premises.115  
 
Although courts clearly recognize harm from physical injuries, courts are 
reluctant to hold online service providers responsible when their activities 
promote, facilitate, or enable such harm. The physical harm facilitated via online 
stalking is akin to the physical injuries that result when landlords fail to secure 
their property. In cases involving owners of residential property, hospitals, day 
care centers, and shopping malls, courts have extended liability to the owners 
for a third party’s criminal acts 116 Similar to these owners, online platforms and 
service providers exercise control over the use and security of their services, 
courts treat them differently.117 Due in part to Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act and the legal shield it provides, courts have not 
taken up the invitation to treat digital spaces with the same set of rules as with 




111 Id.  
112 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
113 Id. at 479. 
114 Id. at 487. 
115 Id. at 480. 
116 Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime, 
20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1553, 1582 (2005). 
117 See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1819 (2010). 
118 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); Danielle Keats Citron, 
Cyber Mobs, Disinformation, and Death Videos: The Internet As It Is (and As it Should Be),  118 
Mich. L. Rev. 1073 (2020); Danielle Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: 
Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity , 86 Fordham L. Rev. 401 (2017). 
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B. ECONOMIC HARMS 
 
Privacy violations can result in financial losses that the law has long understood 
as cognizable harm. Even small economic harms are deemed cognizable by 
courts.119 In cases involving identity theft, plaintiffs can prove harm when 
identity thieves steal their personal data and use it to conduct fraudulent 
transactions in their names.120 Difficulties arise if plaintiffs are eventually able 
to clear up the financial pollution left by identity thieves. Suppose an identity 
thief takes out a credit card in a victim’s name. The victim spends a considerable 
amount of time clearing up the mess and establishing that the debt is not the 
victim’s responsibility. Victims might argue that their time, stress, and anxiety 
to mitigate future economic harm should be compensated, but courts often look 
askance as these things as bases for cognizable harm.121 Many cases involving 
economic harm are data breach cases. As we noted in our article on data breach 
harms, plaintiffs have difficulty providing a causal link between particular data 
breaches and identity theft.122 Moreover, in many cases, the identity theft has 
not yet occurred, and many courts refuse to recognize a harm for the risk of 
future economic loss.123 
 
In cases involving the use and sharing of personal data, courts often refuse to 
find economic harm. In Dwyer v. American Express,124 a group of cardholders 
sued American Express for creating profiles of them based on their spending 
habits and using these profiles for marketing. The cardholders argued that this 
activity was a violation of the tort of appropriation of name or likeness. They 
contended that American Express appropriated for its own use or benefit their 
names or likenesses without their consent. The court, however, concluded that 
although “each cardholder’s name is valuable to defendants,” the value of the 
American Express lists was due to its “categorizing and aggregating these 
names.” American Express’s use of the information does “not deprive any of the 
cardholders of any value their individual names may possess.”125 Thus, the 
cardholders could not establish harm. 
 
Many privacy violations involve the loss of important opportunities rather than 
direct financial injuries. We could not find any privacy cases recognizing a harm 
for loss of productivity or time to deal with privacy violations. In other contexts, 
however, courts readily recognize a similar type of harm. For example, courts 
recognize loss of consortium, which is defined as the “conjugal fellowship of 
husband and wife, and the right of each to the company, cooperation, affection, 
 
119 LaVigne v. First Cmty. Bancshares, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1146 (D.N.M. 2016) 
(“Regardless of how small the harm is, it is actual and it is real.”). 
120 Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note X at 754-56.  
121 Id. at 748-53.  
122 Id. at 756-60.  
123 Id. at 750-52.  
124 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. 1995). 
125 For a different outcome in an action brought by New York Attorney General under state 
UPDA law, see Citron, supra note. 
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and aid of the other in every conjugal relation.”126 The concept of “consortium” 
translates the loss of quality time into an economic harm. Although this concept 
has firm roots in the law, it has not developed to encompass the loss of quality 
time more generally and has not become part of privacy cases.   
 
C. REPUTATIONAL HARMS 
 
Privacy violations can result in reputational injuries, which have a long history 
of recognition. Reputational harms impair a person’s ability to maintain 
“personal esteem in the eyes of others” and can taint a person’s image.127 They 
can result in lost business, employment, or social rejection.  
 
The law has treated reputational harms as distinct from physical and property 
injuries. As Justice Potter Stewart remarked of defamation law, an individual’s 
right to the protection of his good name reflects “our basic concept of the 
essential dignity and worth of every human being.”128 Under the umbrella of 
defamation law, the torts of libel and slander impose liability when a person 
makes a “false and defamatory statement concerning another.”129 The tort of 
false light, which emerged out of the Warren and Brandeis article, protects 
against widely publicizing “a matter concerning another that places the other 
before the public in a false light” that is “highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.”130  
 
A longstanding rule in defamation law is that certain defamatory falsehoods 
(such as the claim that someone has a sexually transmitted disease) warrant the 
recovery of  damages without evidentiary proof.131 Although presumed damages 
have been disallowed for defamation lawsuits by public officials and public 
figures, such damages are permitted in a “vast number of cases.”132  
Additionally, in other cases where plaintiffs must prove reputational damage but 
cannot do so, they still may obtain “nominal damages” – typically one dollar.133 
Although common in defamation cases, nominal damages are not restricted to 
defamation.134 As Megan Cambre notes, “An award of nominal damages 
recognizes that a plaintiff’s right has been violated. It further provides recovery 
for that legal wrong.”135 There is currently a circuit split on whether nominal 
 
126 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY  
127 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 175 (2008). 
128 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
129 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559.   
130 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E.   
131 Michael K. Steenson, Presumed Damages in Defamation Law, 40 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 
1492, 1492 (2014).  
132 Id. 
133 Megan E. Cambre, A Single Symbolic Dollar: How Nominal Damages Can Keep Lawsuits 
Alive, 52 Ga. L. Rev. 933, 937 (2018). 
134 Id. at 938 (“Nominal damages are available as a remedy in all types of cases.”).  
135 Id. at 950.  
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damages are sufficient to confer standing.136 
 
In at least one case, a court recognized reputational harm caused indirectly when 
personal data was misused by a social media platform to grow membership in 
the platform’s user base. In Perkins v. LinkedIn, the professional social network 
site downloaded users’ email contacts, using them to ask users’ contacts to 
connect on the site without the users’ permission. Users sued LinkedIn on the 
grounds that sending repeated invitations to their contacts caused them 
reputational harm because their contacts might think that they sent the repeated 
invitations. The court concluded that they had alleged cognizable harm – that 
LinkedIn engaged in misleading commercial speech causing injury.137  
 
D. EMOTIONAL HARMS 
 
One of the most common types of harm caused by privacy violations is 
emotional distress. Emotional distress encompasses a wide range of emotions, 
including annoyance, frustration, anger, and various degrees of anxiety.  
 
The impact of emotional harm varies depending upon the emotion triggered. 
Fear can be among the most damaging emotions given its impact on people’s 
life choices. One of us has chronicled the devastating impact that fear has had 
on women who faced a perfect storm of impersonation, doxing, nude photos, 
and threats online.138 Privacy violations can cause emotional distress that can 
impede someone’s life as much as certain physical injuries. The emotional toll 
of identity theft can adversely affect victims’ work and relationships.139 
 
Courts, however, have struggled with how to recognize emotional distress as a 
cognizable harm, resulting in a messy and inconsistent body of caselaw. In one 
sphere of tort law—the privacy torts spawned from Warren and Brandeis’s 
article—courts have consistently recognized emotional distress alone as 
cognizable harm. The privacy torts, however, are more of an exception than the 
rule. The special oasis afforded to the privacy torts likely is due to their genesis 
from the Warren and Brandeis article, which emphatically noted that privacy 
violations primarily involve an “injury to the feelings.”140 Privacy invasions 
interfered with a person’s “estimate of himself,” inflicting “mental pain and 
distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”141  
 
Specifically addressing judicial reluctance to recognizing emotional harm, 
Warren and Brandeis began by noting how the common law had matured to 
 
136 Id. at 948-50.  
137 Perkins v. LinkedIn, 53 F. Supp. 3d 1222 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  
138 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); Danielle Keats Citron, 
Cyber Civil Rights, 89 BU Law Rev. 61 (2009). 
139 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Victims of Identity Theft, 2012,” December 2013, at 10 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit12.pdf. 
140 Id. at 197. 
141 Id.  
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recognize and redress a variety of types of intangible harms beyond physical 
ones. “[I]n early times,” they wrote, “the law gave a remedy only for physical 
interference with life and property.”142 Subsequently, the law expanded to 
recognize incorporeal injuries; “[f]rom the action of battery grew that of assault. 
Much later there came a qualified protection of the individual against offensive 
noises and odors, against dust and smoke, and excessive vibration. The law of 
nuisance was developed.”143 They noted how defamation law protected a 
person’s name without requiring proof of financial or physical harm.144 In 
essence, Warren and Brandeis argued that recognition of emotional harm was a 
sign of a more advanced civilization, and by implication, failure to do so would 
be crude and uncivilized. Because Warren and Brandeis tied the privacy torts so 
tightly to emotional harm, it would be somewhat odd and nonsensical for courts 
to recognize the privacy torts but not allow pure emotional harms for recovery. 
 
Privacy tort cases readily allow emotional distress as the sole basis of harm.145 
Cases “collectively reject any suggestion that special damages or physical 
injuries are a threshold pre-condition to recovery.”146 Courts have recognized as 
cognizable harms feelings of violation, mortification, fear, humiliation, and 
embarrassment, among other things.147 The Restatement of Torts clearly 
indicates that plaintiffs can recover for emotional distress alone.148  
 
In countless privacy tort cases, courts do not question the viability of the harm.149 
The issue is so clear and settled that courts do not even bother to mention it. 
Oddly, beyond the four privacy torts, courts view pure emotional distress with 
skepticism. Perhaps this odd disjunction is due to judges being relatively 
unfamiliar with the Warren and Brandeis privacy torts, and thus they lack an 
appreciation of the clear recognition of emotional distress in these cases.  
 
In contract law, courts have been reluctant to recognize emotional harm, but they 
have shifted on this issue to move toward a greater allowance of recovery for 
emotional harm. The general rule is that emotional distress damages are not 
permitted for breach of contract. The rule emerges from the famous English case 
from 1854, Hadley v. Baxendale.150 Although Hadley is the prevailing rule, it 
was once considered a radical departure from the existing rule that damages for 
breach of contract could encompass all losses suffered by the plaintiff, including 
emotional distress. Hadley was part of a general movement in England to limit  
 
142 Id. at 193. 
143 Id. at 194. 
144 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623 (1977). Defamation liability includes redress for 
emotional distress caused by the defamatory publication. Id. 
145 Brents v. Morgan, 299 SW 967, 971 (Ky 1927). 
146 DAVID. A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS §3-8 at p. 3-89.  
147 ELDER 3:8 3-90 to 3-92. 
148 Restatement (Second) of Torts 652H comm. b. 
149 Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra, at X.  
150 Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). 
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the discretion of juries and to shift more power to judges.151 Justifications for the 
Hadley rule in U.S. contract law are based on fears of fabricated claims, 
disproportionate compensation, and unforeseeable damages.152   
 
Nonetheless, courts have been making a number of exceptions to the Hadley 
rule, such as “when the breach is willful or wanton in nature of if the breach 
causes bodily harm.”153 Another exception is when the “contract is personal in 
nature,” such as contracts to take photographs, to supply wedding dresses, or to 
perform cosmetic surgery.154 As one commentator has noted, “courts have 
frequently allowed non-economic damages in breach of contract actions, despite 
forging the limiting rule, and clearly ‘have not applied it inflexibly.’”155 
Although the law of recovery of emotional distress damages from contracts is in 
flux and does not clearly encompass privacy and security issues, there is enough 
of a foundation in the law for courts to at least explore the issue as law develops.  
 
E. RELATIONSHIP HARMS 
 
Privacy violations can harm personal and professional relationships as well as 
relationships with organizations. People modulate personal relationships by 
maintaining boundaries around their information or by withholding information 
from some people and not others. Strangers develop close relationships by 
entrusting each other with deeply personal information. Consider 
communications among people using fertility tracking apps. On apps like Clue, 
subscribers gather online to explore struggles with miscarriages, abortions, and 
infertility. They often form bonds with each other. Their relationships depend 
upon trusting each other to maintain the confidentiality of their information.  
 
Relationship harms are two-fold: most immediately, the loss of confidentiality 
and in the longer term, damage to the trust that is essential for the relationship 
to continue.156 As Nancy Levit remarks, the “development of protection for 
relational interests evidences a communitarian view of the role of tort law. . . . 
The vision being promoted is one of the responsible social interaction: a 
commitment to the value of the permanency of relationships and to appropriate 
treatment within those relationships.”157 
 
151 Mara Kent, The Common-Law History of Non-Economic Damages in Breach of Contract 
Actions Versus Willful Breach of Contract Actions, 11 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 481, 487-91 
(2005). 
152 Kent, Common-Law History, supra at 493.  
153 Kent, supra, at 493. See also 11 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 59.1, at 
539 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2005) (exceptions to Hadley rule include “(1) cases where 
such suffering accompanies a bodily injury; and (2) where it was caused intentionally or in a 
manner that is wanton or reckless”). 
154 Kent, supra, at 501.  
155 Kent, supra, at 493 (quoting E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.17 (3d ed. 1999)).  
156 See Danielle Keats Citron, Why Sexual Privacy Matters for Trust, 96 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1189 
(2019). 
157 Levit, supra note. 




The law has recognized relationship harms, though it has done so inconsistently. 
Evidentiary privileges restrict the disclosure of communications between 
attorney and client, priest and penitent, husband and wife, and psychotherapist 
and patient.158 The point of protecting certain relationships is to foster candid 
expression and the preservation of the relationships.  
 
The breach of confidentiality tort extends to certain relationships—mostly 
professional ones—but it fails to protect many other relationships, such as 
personal and familial ones.159 Courts have refused to treat companies as having 
a duty to keep personal data confidential even though they are in a position of 
trust and exercise power over individuals’ personal data.160  
 
The law of fiduciary relationships also safeguards against relationship harms. A 
fiduciary relationship has long been part of the law of trusts and has been 
recognized as a special relationship.161 Because the trustee is in a “position of 
special trust, the trustee owes certain special duties to the beneficiary.”162 As one 
of us has noted, a wide array of relationships have been deemed to be fiduciary 
ones, and the law is open-ended about recognizing such relationships.163 
According to Jack Balkin, “Because of their special power over others and their 
special relationships to others, information fiduciaries have special duties to act 
in ways that do not harm the interests of the people whose information they 
collect, analyze, use, sell, and distribute.”164 Fiduciaries owe special duties 
including confidentiality, loyalty, transparency, care, and others.165  
 
The relationships recognized as fiduciary ones is open-ended rather than a fixed 
list. In breach of confidentiality cases, courts have recognized fiduciary 
relationships between doctor and patient, lawyer and client, bank and customer, 
as well as school and student.166 One of us argued that the concept of fiduciary 
relationships can be expanded to regulate consumer privacy because “companies 
collecting and using our personal information stand in a fiduciary relationship 
with us.”167 
 
158 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note _, at 499-504.  
159 Solove & Richards, Privacy’s Other Path, supra note, at 176-78. 
160 Id. at 157-58.  
161 ARI WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST (2019); Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty 
of Loyalty for Privacy Law (on file with authors); Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, 
Privacy Law’s Constitutional Moment and the Limits of Data Protection , 61 B.C. L. Rev. 1687 
(2020). 
162 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE 102 (2004).   
163 Id. at 103.  
164 Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment , 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1183, 
1186 (2016).   
165 Lauren Henry Scholz, Fiduciary Boilerplate, __ J. Corp. L. __ (draft at p. 65) (June 5, 2020), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3620164.  
166 Id. 
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Recently, a number of scholars have further developed this argument, most 
notably Jack Balkin, Woodrow Hartzog, Neil Richards, and Lauren Scholz. As 
Lauren Scholz observes, “[f]iduciary law’s core goal of preventing opportunistic 
behavior.”168 She contends that “[i]mplying a fiduciary relationship has the 
advantage of enabling courts and the justice system to allow and enforce 
expectations as they are situated in concrete relationships.”169 Thus far, however, 
the application of the law of fiduciary relationships to privacy has developed 
slowly, mainly in breach of confidentiality cases in a limited set of professional 
relationships, but it certainly has potential to develop further in the future. 
 
F. CHILLING EFFECT HARMS 
 
Privacy violations can produce harm by inhibiting people from engaging in 
certain civil liberties such as free speech, political participation, religious 
activity, free association, freedom of belief, and freedom to explore ideas. Such 
harm is often called a “chilling effect.”170 As Frederick Schauer observes: “The 
very essence of a chilling effect is an act of deterrence.”171 According to Neil 
Richards, the failure to protect privacy can chill individuals from engaging in 
reading or researching.172 In cases involving rights under the First Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution, courts have sometimes recognized harm when people 
are chilled from exercising rights, such as free speech or free association.173 
 
Chilling effects have an impact on individual speakers and  society at large as 
they reduce the range of viewpoints expressed and the nature of expression that 
is shared.174 Monitoring of communications can make people less likely to 
engage in certain conversations, express certain views, or share personal 
information. Consider the impact of news that the gay dating app Grindr had 
shared subscribers’ HIV status with analytics firms. Subscribers expressed 
profound dismay. Individuals told the press that they would no longer share that 
information on that app or any dating app—it was simply not worth the 
possibility that employers or others could find out their HIV status and hold it 
against them.175 
 
Courts have been uneasy about recognizing chilling effects, and the law has 
 
168 Id. at 66.  
169 Id. at 67.  
170 Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 NYU L. Rev. 112, 142-
43 (2007).  
171 Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 
58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 701 (1978). 
172 NEIL M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY 165 (2014). 
173 Solove, First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, supra note X, at 143-51.  
174 NEIL M. RICHARDS: INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY (2014); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 
Tex. L. Rev.; Julie E. Cohen, Subject as Object, Stan. L. Rev. 
175 Danielle Keats Citron, A New Compact for Sexual Privacy, William & Mary L. Rev. 
(forthcoming). 
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wavered. In Laird v. Tatum, the U.S. Supreme Court limited the chilling effect 
doctrine by concluding that “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an 
adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of 
specific future harm.”176 Courts have subsequently struggled to determine the 
line between an objective and subjective chill.177 
 
Despite the somewhat murky status of the law, the concept of chilling is widely 
accepted even if its precise contours remain unclear.  Although the chilling effect 
doctrine emerges from cases involving the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, the concept could certainly be applied to other legal contexts.   
 
G. DISCRIMINATION HARMS 
 
Privacy violations can cause discrimination harms, which involve entrenching 
inequality and disadvantaging women and people from marginalized  
communities. Discrimination harms thwart people’s ability to have an equal 
chance to obtain and keep jobs, secure affordable insurance, find housing, and 
to pursue other crucial life opportunities. The misuse of personal data can be 
particularly costly to women, sexual minorities, and nonwhites given the 
prevalence of destructive stereotypes and the disproportionate surveillance of 
women and marginalized communities in their intimate lives.178 For example, 
employers and health insurance companies can access information that women 
share with period-tracking apps (including their moodiness and cramps), which 
could result in raised premiums and denied promotions.179 Women and 
minorities are often disproportionately targeted for vicious online harassment, 
which often involves doxing – the sharing of their personal data such as home 
address and location – in order to expose them to physical danger.180 Harassers 
post victims’ nude photos and embarrassing information about their sex lives or 
sexual health, causing them substantial emotional and reputational harm.181 
Although these types of harm are separate categories in our typology, there is a 
distinct and additional dimension that they add: the entrenchment of existing 
patterns of inequality.  
 
In cases involving cyber mobs that inundate victims with crude, threatening, and 
 
176 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).  
177 Solove, First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, supra note X, at 143-44.  
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abusive comments, plaintiffs have sought to protect themselves by bringing 
privacy tort cases.182 But litigation has complicated by the fact that the harm is 
often caused by the totality of the comments, making it hard to allocate the harm 
among the multitude of commenters.183 The members of the mob are often 
anonymous, and it is difficult and expensive to identify them.184 Even when the 
perpetrators are tracked down, suing them is often impractical because they often 
are unable to pay enough monetary damages to incentivize lawyers to litigate.185 
To combat cyber mobs effectively, victims turn to social media platforms to shut 
down the mob, but Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act immunizes 
these platforms from liability for user-generated content.186   
 
In some cases, the information about plaintiffs is innocuous in the abstract, such 
as their home addresses. Such information may already be available online from 
other sources. But when this data is used to dox victims, the data no longer is 
innocuous. Courts are generally reluctant to view the disclosure of home 
addresses as harmful (or even as a violation of privacy) unless plaintiffs have 
done everything that they can to keep their home addresses from the public (such 
as removing their addresses from the white pages), but some courts have 
recognized the harm.187 For example, in Planned Parenthood v. American 
Coalition of Life Activists, an anti-abortion activist group doxed abortion 
doctors. Some of these doctors were murdered, and the living ones whose 
personal information was posted online sued and argued that they feared for their 
safety. The court sided with the doctors.188 Cases like Planned Parenthood are 
rare, however, and few plaintiffs have been able to use litigation to combat 
doxing.  
 
Beyond doxing and threats targeted at people in marginalized groups, there are 
less overt forms of discrimination harms. These harms are difficult to redress 
because they often occur in the shadows. The decision-making process of 
employers, insurance companies, landlords, and other powerful actors is opaque. 
If an employer used a third-party hiring service to score candidates, then rejected 
applicants will have no way to know that the hiring service relied upon their 
intimate information (like their painful periods or infertility).189  
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note. 
183 CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note. 
184 Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2018). 
185 CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note. 
186 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE 
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A key aspect of discrimination harms is the unequal frequency, extensiveness, 
and impact of privacy violations on marginalized people. People of color are 
disproportionately targeted by surveillance.190 Algorithms that appear neutral 
often have disproportionate effects on minorities.191 Poor people are often 
subjected to oppressive surveillance as part of public assistance bureaucracy. 
Black mothers are “stripped of formal privacy rights claims by signing an 
encompassing waiver” when applying for assistance.192 As Khiara Bridges 
contends, “poor mothers are not given privacy rights because society, and thus 
the law, presumes that their enjoyment of privacy will realize no value or 
negative value.”193 Mary Anne Franks notes that surveillance often does not 
affect marginalized and non-marginalized people equally: “For the less 
privileged members of society, surveillance does not simply mean inhibited 
Internet searches or decreased willingness to make online purchases; it can mean 
an entire existence under scrutiny, with every personal choice carrying a risk of 
bodily harm.”194  
 
Privacy torts and other tort claims lack the language and concepts to address 
discrimination harms.195 The disparate effects of certain privacy violations are 
not considered as part of the harm equation. In contrast, federal statutes do 
recognize privacy violations as producing discrimination harm, such as the 
federal Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA). GINA prohibits employers from requesting, 
requiring, or obtaining employees’ genetic information. The ADA limits the 
ability of employers to make medical examinations or inquiries of job applicants 
under a number of circumstances.196  
  
The civil rights legal tradition has the capacity and vocabulary to address 
discrimination harm—the denial of social and economic opportunities due to 
one’s membership in a protected group.197 Federal and state civil rights laws 
secure the ability to work, attend school, use the telephone, secure housing, and 
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vote on equal terms.198 But these laws still have not been applied sufficiently to 
privacy violations. One of us has proposed situating and treating privacy as a civil 
right so discrimination harms caused by privacy violations can be addressed.199 
Existing civil rights laws admittedly do not cover all social goods in need of 
protection200 or to all parties given the state action doctrine.201 They mostly do 
not constrain corporate handling of personal data.202 Nonetheless, situating 
private sector surveillance of intimate life as a matter of civil rights helps begin 
the conversation about what those freedoms should be in the context of privacy 
law specifically and civil rights law more generally.   
 
H. THWARTED EXPECTATIONS HARMS 
 
A common type of privacy violation involves thwarting people’s privacy 
expectations by breaking promises made about the collection, use, and 
disclosure of personal data. Courts are generally dismissive of thwarted 
expectations as a cognizable harm unless it is accompanied by other harms, such 
as reputational, economic, or emotional harm. As Margot Kaminsky aptly 
observes, “in the information privacy context, the Supreme Court and others 
have repeatedly asked for privacy plaintiffs to show something more.”203  
 
When data is used improperly without people’s consent, courts tend to look for 
economic harm rather than recognize that improper use of personal data is 
harmful in and of itself. In In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation204 
plaintiffs sued Google for using their personal data in different ways than had 
been promised, but the court found that they lacked standing because they failed 
to allege how Google’s “use of the information deprived them of the 
information’s economic value.”205 In Fraley v. Facebook, the court also focused 
on economic value when it concluded that plaintiffs suffered harm when 
 
198 Danielle Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Cyber Civil Rights in an Age of COVID, HARV. L. 
REV. BLOG (May 14, 2020), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/cyber-civil-rights-in-the-tim e-
of-covid-19/. 
199Danielle K. Citron, Why We Need to Talk About Privacy as a Civil Right, ILLINOIS L. REV. 
(forthcoming in symposium issue on Helen Norton’s When Government Speaks); Citron, Cyber 
Civil Rights, supra note, at 89 (“Traditional tort and criminal law fail to respond to such systemic 
harm and, indeed, may obscure a full view of the damage.”). 
200 In her important new book, Robin West calls for a transformative understanding of civil rights 
that does not merely prohibit discrimination but that entails rights essential to the justice of the 
nation. ROBIN L. WEST, CIVIL RIGHTS: RETHINKING THEIR NATURAL FOUNDATION (2019). 
201 Id. (exploring the various ways that civil rights laws have failed to fulfill their 
potential to protect social goods themselves). 
202 As scholars have explored, antidiscrimination laws like Title VII are ill-suited to address the 
use of discriminatory algorithms in employment matters. See Deborah Hellman, Measuring 
Algorithmic Fairness, 106 VA. L. REV. 811 (2020); Pauline Kim, Data Discrimination at Work, 
58 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 857 (2018); Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s 
Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671 (2016). 
203 Margot E. Kaminski, Standing After Snowden: Lessons on Privacy Harm from National 
Security Surveillance Litigation, 66 DePaul L. Rev. 413, 416 (2017). 
204 2013 WL 6248499 (N.D. Cal. 2013).  
205 Id. 
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Facebook used their “likes” to promote products without their permission. 206 
The court held that “personalized endorsement” to friends “has concrete, 
provable value in the economy at large.”207  
 
Generally, courts have not found harm when companies share personal data with 
third parties in violation of their privacy policies. In Smith v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, for example, the court concluded that plaintiffs suffered no harm when a 
bank that sold their personal data to third parties in violation of its privacy 
policy: “[C]lass members were merely offered products and services which they 
were free to decline. This does not qualify as actual harm.”208  
 
Plaintiffs have fared better when statutes are the source of the expectation that 
data will not be shared. In In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation, the 
court concluded that a Viacom’s improper collection of personal data about the 
videos people watched on its website and its disclosure of the data to Google 
was a cognizable harm. The court noted that “when it comes to laws that protect 
privacy, a focus on economic loss is misplaced” and that “the unlawful 
disclosure of legally protected information” was “a clear de facto injury.”209 In 
Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., the Ninth Circuit concluded that sharing personal 
data with a third party in violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) 
was a harm because “both the common law and the literal understanding of 
privacy encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or her 
person.”210 
 
In contract law, courts are adamant about focusing on economic harm. In In Re 
Google, Inc. Cookie Placement Privacy Litigation, Google tracked users’ 
Internet activity in violation of its promise to respect users’ “do not track” 
settings. The court held that the plaintiffs could not prove harm because they 
could not demonstrate that Google interfered with their ability to monetize their 
personal data.211 In a series of cases involving airlines that shared passenger data 
with the government in violation of their privacy policies, courts held that the 
plaintiffs failed to show harm.212 For example, in In re Jet Blue Airways Corp. 
Privacy Litigation, the court held that recovery in contract “allows only for 
economic losses.”213  
 
Many courts fixate on whether plaintiffs have read and relied on the privacy 
policy of a company, but the privacy policy plays a small role in forming 
 
206 Fraley v. Facebook, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Ca. 2011). 
207 Id. at 799.  
208 Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 293 A.D.2d 598, 599 (N.Y.App.Div. 2002).  
209 In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 272-73, 274 (3d Cir. 2016). 
210 Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2017). 
211 In re Google, Inc. Cookie Placement Privacy Litig., (D. Del. Oct. 9, 2013). 
212 In re Jet Blue Airways Corp. Privacy Litigation, 379 F. Supp.2d 299, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); 
In re Northwest Airlines Privacy Litigation, 2004 WL 1278459 (D. Mill. 2004); Dyer v. 
Northwest Airlines Corp., 334 F.Supp.2d 1196 (D.N.D. 2004). 
213 In re Jet Blue Airways Corp. Privacy Litigation, 379 F. Supp.2d 299, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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people’s privacy expectations.214 This is especially true because hardly anyone 
reads privacy policies, and it is not rational to do so given the vast number of 
organizations collecting data about people.215 Instead of focusing on the 
promises in privacy policies in isolation, courts should consider more broadly 
people’s reasonable expectations regarding privacy. Website or browser privacy 
settings, company advertising, statements, and other design elements have an 
influence on people’s expectations.216 Courts, however, will not go this far, and 
cases to date have focused mainly on violations of explicit promises in privacy 
policies or statutory requirements. 
 
However, there is a basis in contract law to recognize thwarted expectations as 
a harm. When a party to a contract fails to perform a term in a contract, even if 
it is a matter of mere personal taste that lacks value, courts will still enforce the 
term. In construction contract cases, for example, the difference in the value of 
property with and without the plaintiff’s preferences might be slight or nil. 
Instead of assessing damages based on the difference in actual value, courts 
assess damages for the “cost of completion” because the “fair market value of a 
home does not necessarily reflect the value to the homeowner.”217 As Judge 
Cardozo famously stated in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, in a construction 
contract, “[t]here is no general license to install whatever, in the builder’s 
judgment, may be regarded as ‘just as good.’”218 These cases suggest that the 
failure to respect people’s preferences is a cognizable harm even these 
preferences do not add any economic value. For many people, their privacy 
preferences are an important consideration about whether or not to use a 
particular service or product.  
 
In contrast to contract law, the FTC readily enforces for violations of privacy 
policies. Under the FTC’s enforcement of the prohibition on “deceptive” acts or 
practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC has viewed broken promises 
in privacy notices to be sufficient for harm.219 Deception need not just involve 
statements made in privacy notices, as the FTC has found other statements about 
privacy to be deceptive.220 The very crux of deception as used in the context of 
broken promises is that the harm is in personal data being used in ways that 
differ from how companies informed people it would be used. One of us has 
 
214 Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1665 (2011). 
215 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1879 (2013). 
216 Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1665 (2011). 
217 Willie’s Constr. Co. v. Baker, 596 N.E.2d 958 (Indiana Ct. of Appeals 1992); see also Lyon 
v. Belosky Construction, 247 A.D.2d 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (awarding “cost of 
performance” damages in part based on the observation that “the aesthetic appearance of the 
home, both inside and out, was of utmost importance to plaintiffs.”); American Standard, Inc. v. 
Schectman, 80 A.D.2d 318 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (contractor’s failure to complete work 
resulted in $3,000 diminution in value but $90,000 in damages was awarded). 
218 Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 243 (1921). 
219 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Harzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
Colum. L. Rev. 583, 628-30 (2014).  
220 Id. at 630-33. 
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argued that the FTC could and should extend its jurisprudence further to pursue 
cases where people’s expectations were thwarted even if no false statements are 
made.221 
 
Critics claim that the FTC should curtail the extent to which it recognizes harm 
for thwarted expectations.  James Cooper and Joshua Wright contend that the 
FTC has become undisciplined about how it recognizes privacy harms.222  They 
argue that “unexpected data practices do not always equate to privacy harm.”223 
They use an example of a smart oven app that records oven usage data, which is 
improperly shared with third parties. They argue that the FTC should not 
recognize harm in this case because the app’s thwarting of privacy expectations 
“may be mediated through the market or the legal system.”224 They argue that 
“a focus on expectations, rather than harm, necessarily will be overly 
inclusive.”225 
 
The market, however, is not adequate to address the problems with the app. 
When people use an app that thwarts their privacy expectations, people’s ability 
to assess the risks of using the app is impeded. The market cannot work fairly if 
people’s expectations are completely wrong, if people lack knowledge of 
potential future uses of their personal data, and if people have no way to balance 
the benefits and risks of using products or services.   
 
I. CONTROL HARMS 
 
Many statutes provide certain rights or restrictions regarding the retention and 
use of personal data independently from what is promised in an organization’s 
privacy policy. The harm for violations of these rights or restrictions is not 
thwarted expectations, as people might not have known about these statutes. 
Instead, the harm involves the loss of control over personal data.  
 
Courts have been inconsistent in recognizing the loss of control as a harm. In 
Braitberg v. Charter Communications, for example, the Eighth Circuit denied 
standing to plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit against a cable company for failing 
to delete their personal data in violation of the Cable Communications Policy 
Act. The court concluded that the mere improper retention of data was not 
sufficient, by itself, to create a “material risk of harm.”226 In Gubala v. Time 
Warner Cable, Inc., the court denied standing to a cable subscriber suing a cable 
company for improperly retaining personal data under the Cable Act because 
 
221 Id. at 667-69. 
222 James C. Cooper & Joshua D. Wright, The Missing Role of Economics in FTC Privacy Policy, 
in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 465, 479 (Jules Polonetsky, Evan Selinger, 
& Omer Tene, eds., 2017). 
223 Id. at 480.  
224 Id. at 480. 
225 Id. at 480. 
226 Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2016). 
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there was no harm for merely holding data.227 Similarly, in Rivera v Google, the 
court denied standing to plaintiffs who sued Google for storing their biometric 
data without their consent, a violation of the Illinois Biometric Information 
Privacy Act (BIPA). The court concluded that there was no harm because the 
data was not shared with anyone.228 There are other courts that recognize the 
loss of control as a harm sufficient to justify standing.229 
 
Losing control over our personal data constitutes an injury to our peace of mind 
and our ability to manage risk. In the clutches of organizations, personal data 
can be used for a wide array of purposes for an indefinite period of time. Privacy 
laws seek to regulate data flows to protect individuals from potential 
downstream uses. The practicalities of litigation, which are constrained by 
statutes of limitation, require an assessment of the situation before the end of the 
data life cycle.  
 
Warren and Brandeis based their argument upon an English case from 1848 – 
Prince Albert v. Strange. This case involved a suit at equity to prevent William 
Strange from publishing a catalog describing etchings that the royal couple made 
about their family.230 The court enjoined the publication of the catalog. Warren 
and Brandeis argued that the case involved the protection of “inviolate 
personality.”231 The case did not involve lurid images or embarrassing secrets 
(they were endearing hand drawn images of a mother with her child), and the 
couple had shared these personal etchings with loved ones.232 Thus, the harm, 
as imagined by Warren and Brandeis, was the undermining of control over the 
extent to which personal information is circulated. This type of harm should be 
enough.    
 
J. DATA QUALITY HARMS 
 
Many privacy laws require that organizations adhere to the principle of “data 
quality” – keeping data accurate, complete, and up-to-date.233 Courts are 
inconsistent in whether inaccuracies in data constitutes a cognizable harm.   
 
In Spokeo, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court was skeptical about whether 
inaccurate data rose to the level of being cognizable. The plaintiff had 
 
227 Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2016). 
228 Rivera v Google, 366 F. Supp. 3d 998 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
229 In contrast to Grubala and Rivera, the Illinois Supreme Court in Rosenbach v. Six Flags 
Entertainment Corporation, concluded that plaintiffs seeking relief under BIPA “need not allege 
some actual injury or adverse effect” to be considered aggrieved persons. Rosenbach diverges 
from Grubala and Rivera because it involves a holding that an actual injury is not required by 
the BIPA, and standing is not required in state court. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment 
Corporation et al., No. 123186, 2019 Ill. Lexis 7 (Ill. Jan. 25, 2019). 
230 Prince Albert v. Strange, (1849) 64 Eng. Rep. 293, 295 (Ch.). 
231 Warren and Brandeis, supra note X, at 205.  
232 See The Right to Privacy (2020). 
233 CITES 
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complained about errors in his consumer report that falsely stated that he was 
married and had professional degrees.  The Court did not examine the specific 
errors that the plaintiff complained about. Instead, the Court spoke generally 
about errors: “An example that comes readily to mind is an incorrect zip code. 
It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without 
more, could work any concrete harm.”234 Unfortunately, the Court chose a rather 
poor example, as a lot can be inferred about a person based on their zip code. 
Numerous demographic generalizations can be made about many zip codes 
about race, religion, ethnicity, income, and more.   
 
The Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit to determine whether the 
errors in the plaintiff’s records were sufficiently harmful. On remand, the Ninth 
Circuit held Robins had alleged a cognizable harm.235 The court noted that 
accuracy and other components of data quality involved “interests protected by 
FCRA's procedural requirements are ‘real,’ rather than purely legal 
creations.”236 According to the court, “given the ubiquity and importance of 
consumer reports in modern life—in employment decisions, in loan 
applications, in home purchases, and much more—the real-world implications 
of material inaccuracies in those reports seem patent on their face.”237 Further, 
the court observed that “[c]ourts have long entertained causes of action to 
vindicate intangible harms caused by certain untruthful disclosures about 
individuals, and we respect Congress's judgment that a similar harm would result  
from inaccurate credit reporting.”238 
 
Finding specific economic harms for incorrect information in records can be 
challenging because errors or missions could lead to a variety of consequences 
at some point in the future, long beyond the statute of limitations for most causes 
of action. Suppose, for example, that a credit report erroneously states that a 
person went bankrupt. Whether the error causes any economic harm will depend 
upon how the report is used. A wise person would likely refrain from seeking a 
loan while the error remains in the report, as this could result in denial of the 
loan or a higher interest rate. For example, in Sarver v. Experian, the court held 
that the plaintiff failed to establish actual damages based on an inaccurate 
bankruptcy notation in his credit report before he tried to apply for credit from 
a third party.  Afterwards, he could establish damages.239 But to have courts 
recognize harm, should a person have to go through the charade of applying for 
a loan in order to generate proof of economic harm? 
 
Inaccuracies create risk of future harm that are difficult to predict, but they are 
still harmful in the present day because they cause a loss of data hygiene. 
 
234 CITE 
235 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 931 (2018). 
236 Id.at 1114.  
237 Id.  
238 Id. at 1115.  
239 Sarver v. Experian, 390 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2004).  
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Imagine that someone that you invited into your house takes all your clothes out 
of the drawers and closets and throws them on the floor. The person removes all 
your books from the shelves and shoves them in a corner. The person tracks dirt 
all over your floors, though it does not permanently stain them. No structural 
damage is done to the house, but it is now a mess. You have been harmed even 
though the value of your home is not diminished. You have suffered a loss. You 
would likely find the mess and dirt in your home to be unpleasant. You might 
not invite guests over to your home until it is cleaned. The harm is not the 
diminishment in value of the house; it is interference with your enjoyment of 
your home as well as the time and expense to clean up the mess. When data is 
sullied with misleading or incorrect information, there is a similar mess – just 
one in digital space rather than in a physical place. And, unlike in real space, the 
contamination can be difficult to eradicate. It can be hard for individuals to f ind 
out about errors and when they do, third parties will ignore requests to correct 
them without the real risk of litigation costs.  
  
K. INFORMED CHOICE HARMS 
 
Courts are inconsistent about recognizing harm for failing to give individuals 
information to assist them in making informed choices about their personal data 
or exercise of privacy rights. In Robertson v. Allied Solutions, for example, the 
plaintiff Robertson applied for a job at Allied. Allied obtained a background 
check on Robertson. Although the FCRA requires that applicants be provided a 
copy of the report and information about their FCRA rights, Allied failed to 
provide either to Robertson. The Seventh Circuit held that she was harmed 
because she “was denied information that could have helped her craft a response 
to Allied's concerns.”240 Even if the information in the report is true, the court 
noted, a consumer might want to “bring additional facts to the employer's 
attention that put matters in a better light for the consumer.241 
 
In Long v. SEPTA, an employer rejected applicants based on background checks 
that turned up information about convictions involving illegal drugs. Although 
FCRA requires that the applicants be provided a copy of their background check 
report and a written statement of their FCRA rights, SEPTA failed to provide 
these things.242 The court concluded that the failure to provide a copy of the 
reports harmed plaintiffs by denying them the right to “see or respond” to 
them.243 But regarding the failure to inform the applicants about their FCRA 
rights, the court concluded that they lacked standing because the plaintiffs knew 
their FCRA rights “to file this lawsuit within the prescribed limitations period, 
so they were not injured.”244 
 
 
240 Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2018).  
241 Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2018). 
242 Long v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 321 (3d Cir. 2018). 
243 Id. at 324. 
244 Id. at 325.  
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When individuals are not informed of their rights or not given important 
information, they are harmed because they lose their ability to assert their rights 
at the appropriate times, to respond effectively to issues involving their personal 
data, or to make meaningful decisions regarding the use of their data. Laws that 
mandate that people be informed of their rights are designed to empower 
individuals and arm them with appropriate knowledge. The holding in Long 
creates a closed circle where plaintiffs will never be able to enforce FCRA’s 
rights disclosure requirement. If the plaintiffs do not know about their rights, 
then they likely will not know they can bring a lawsuit. If they bring a lawsuit, 
then courts will throw it out because they knew enough about their rights to sue. 
This closed circle all but forecloses enforcement of this provision.  
 
In cases where people are not informed that their personal data was used to make 
a decision about them, they are harmed because informing them is to allow them 
to understand how their data affected a decision and to give them an opportunity 
to respond. This response might not be a direct refutation of the data. The 
response could take many forms, from providing additional data to explaining a 
situation to raising other unrelated considerations that might outweigh the 
negative impact of the data.  Even if the response might fail to change minds, 
people should still have a chance to make their case. By way of analogy, denial 
of people’s day in court is harmful even if they would likely have lost their case. 
The harm is in their losing their right to be heard.   
 
L. VULNERABILITY HARMS 
 
Courts are inconsistent in finding harm for failing to follow security safeguards 
that have not yet resulted in a data breach. For example, the FCRA mandates 
that no more than five digits from a credit card number can be printed on a 
receipt, but far more digits are printed on receipts in violation of the mandate. In 
cases where this provision is violated, some courts have held that there is an 
injury, and other courts have concluded that there is none.245  
 
Consider these opposing findings. In Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., the 
Eleventh Circuit held that printing more digits of a person’s credit card on a 
receipt is an injury in fact because it is akin to a breach of confidentiality.246 
However, in Bassett v. ABM Parking Services, Inc., the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that printing more credit card digits on a receipt was not a sufficient harm 
because Bassett did not allege that another copy of the receipt existed, that his 
receipt was lost or stolen, that he was the victim of identity theft , or even that 
another person apart from his lawyers viewed the receipt.”247  
 
 
245 Compare Guarisma v. Microsoft Corp. with Bassett v. ABM Parking Servs., Inc., 883 F.3d 
776 (9th Cir. 2018); Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc., 861 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017); 
Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2016). 
246 Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 922 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 2019). 
247 Bassett v. ABM Parking Servs., Inc., 883 F.3d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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At first blush, the Basset court notes a number of things that seemingly make the 
risk of future harm from the receipt low. But having the information on the 
receipt presents a risk if the receipt is lost or thrown away. The law’s restriction 
of the digits on the receipt is not to shield the data from the customer who bought 
something and has the receipt. Instead, it is to enable everyone to be able to 
throw away receipts without having to worry about shredding them. This 
commitment promotes good security and alleviates the need for people to go to 
greater lengths to protect themselves.   
 
In contrast to courts, the FTC has enforced against companies with inadequate 
security in the absence of a data breach.  For example, in In the Matter of 
Microsoft Corp., the FTC faulted Microsoft for failing to follow the promises it 
made about the security of a single login service.248  In In re Guess.com, Inc., 
the FTC enforced on a similar deception theory.249 More recently, in In the 
Matter of Zoom Video Communications, Inc., the FTC used an unfairness theory 
to fault Zoom for “limiting the intended benefit of a privacy and security 
safeguard provided by [the] Safari browser.”250 This created a “vulnerability” on 
users’ computers, but the enforcement was not based on any malicious actors 
actually exploiting this vulnerability.  
 
M. DISTURBANCE HARMS 
 
Disturbance harms involve unwanted communications that disturb tranquility, 
interrupt activities, sap time, and otherwise serve as a nuisance. Many courts 
have held that unsolicited telephone calls and text messages in violation of the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) constitute injuries in fact sufficient 
for standing. As one court explained, the harm can involve “wasting the 
consumer’s time” and “interruption and distraction.”251 In Van Patten v. Vertical 
Fitness Group, for example, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[u]nsolicited  
telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy 
and disturb the solitude of their recipients.”252 Other TCPA cases are similar.253 
As the Fourth Circuit explained in Krakauer v. Dish Network, LLC,254 the harm 
the TCPA addresses is receiving calls that people “previously took steps to 
avoid.” Rejecting the notion that this harm was too intangible to be cognizable, 
 
248 In the Matter of Microsoft Corp., No. 012-3240 (Dec. 24, 2002).   
249 In re Guess Jeans, No. 022-3260 (July 30, 2003). 
250 In the Matter of Zoom Communications, Inc. (Nov. 19, 2020).  
251 LaVigne v. First Cmty. Bancshares, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1146 (D.N.M. 2016). 
252 Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC., 847 F.3d 1037 , 1043 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Unsolicited 
telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the 
solitude of their recipients.”). 
253 See, e.g., Susinno v. Work Out World, Inc., 862 F.3d 346 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that 
intangible injuries, such as nuisance and invasion of privacy, constituted the very harm that 
Congress sought to prevent in enacting the TCPA); Melito v. Experian Marketing Solutions, 
Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that unsolicited text messages, like unwanted calls 
or faxes, constitutes the kind of nuisance and privacy harm that Congress identified when 
enacting the TCPA);  
254 Krakauer v. Dish Network, LLC, 925 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 2019).   
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the court stated: “There is nothing ethereal or abstract about it.”255 Some 
courts, however, have rejected harm for certain types of communications under 
the TCPA, such as text messages. In Salcedo v. Hanna,256 the Eleventh Circuit 
found that the receipt of a single text message does not constitute a concrete 
harm because a text message is different from a phone call or fax because a text 
message was nothing more than a momentary annoyance.257 In contrast, in 
Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs.,258 the Seventh Circuit concluded that unwanted text 
messages cause harm because the “undesired buzzing of a cell phone from a text 
message, like the unwanted ringing of a phone from a call, is an intrusion into 
peace and quiet in a realm that is private and personal, [which] is the very harm 
that Congress addressed [in TCPA].”259 
 Some courts have been skeptical of harm for the receipt of spam. In Cherny 
v. Emigrant Bank, the defendant bank improperly shared its customer email 
addresses with third parties, in violation of its privacy policy.260 As a result, the 
plaintiff received spam. The plaintiff sued the bank based on breach of fiduciary 
duty and breach of contract. The court held that “[t]he receipt of spam by itself, 
however, does not constitute a sufficient injury entitling Cherny to compensable 
relief.”261 
 
N. AUTONOMY HARMS 
 
Autonomy harms involve the restriction, coercion, or manipulation of people’s 
choices. People are either directly denied free will to decide or are tricked into 
thinking that they are freely making choices when they are not. In the consumer 
privacy context, the most prevalent form of autonomy harm is “manipulation.” 
Manipulation is a difficult harm to define, as there is a spectrum of ways to 
encourage people to think and act in certain ways, and some are deemed 
persuasion and others manipulation.  
 
Ido Kilovaty contends that manipulation “impairs the ability of individuals to 
make independent and informed opinions and decisions. . . . It effectively 
deprives individuals of their agency by distorting and perverting the way in 
which individuals typically make decisions.”262 According Daniel Susser, Beate 
Roessler, and Helen Nissenbaum, manipulation “is a kind of influence--an 
attempt to change the way someone would behave absent the manipulator's 
interventions.”263 They distinguish manipulation from persuasion and coercion: 
“Persuading someone leaves the choice of the matter entirely up to them, while 
 
255 Id. at 653. 
256 936 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2019). 
257 Id. at 1167. 
258 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2020) 
259 Id. n.1. 
260 Cherny v. Emigrant Bank, 604 F. Supp.2d 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
261 Id. 
262 Ido Kilovaty, Legally Cognizable Manipulation, 34 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 449, 469 (2019). 
263  Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler, and Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden 
Influences in a Digital World, 4 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 1 (2019).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782222
PRIVACY HARMS 
 41 
coercing someone robs them of choice.”264 A coerced person understands that 
they are coerced where as a manipulated person might not realize that they are 
being turned into a puppet: “Coercion is blunt and forthright: one almost always 
knows one is being coerced. Manipulation is subtle and sneaky. Rather than 
simply depriving a person of options as the coercer does, the manipulator 
infiltrates their decision-making process, disposing it to the manipulator's ends, 
which may or may not match their own.”265 According to Cass Sunstein, 
manipulation involves “an effort to influence people’s choices counts as 
manipulative to the extent that it does not sufficiently engage or appeal to their 
capacity for reflection and deliberation.”266 
 
In a survey of various definitions of manipulation, Shaun Spencer observes that 
they all share some common elements: “they all contain the notion of 
circumventing the subject’s rational decision-making process” and most require 
intent to manipulate.267 Drawing from these definitions, Spencer defines 
manipulation as “an intentional attempt to influence a subject’s behavior by 
exploiting a bias or vulnerability.”268 
 
Ryan Calo contends that manipulation “creates subjective privacy harms insofar 
as the consumer has a vague sense that information is being collected and used 
to her disadvantage, but never truly knows how or when.” Manipulation “also 
creates objective privacy harm when a firm uses personal information to extract 
as much rent as possible from the consumer.”269 According to Sunstein, the harm 
of manipulation “is that it can violate people’s autonomy (by making them 
instruments of another’s will) and offend their dignity (by failing to treat them 
with respect).”270 Tal Zarsky contends that manipulation is harmful because 
“[m]anipulative practices impair the process of choosing, subjecting it to the 
preferences and influences of a third party, as opposed to those of the individuals 
themselves.”271 
 
Manipulation can affect not just individuals but also create societal harm, as 
people’s decisions can affect not just themselves but society as well. The 
Cambridge Analytica incident involved the use of personal data on a mass scale 
to influence people’s decisions in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and in the 
United Kingdom’s vote for Brexit.272  
 
The FTC has recognized that trade practices that prevent consumers from 
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“effectively making their own decisions” are ones that cause substantial injury. 
“Most of the Commission's unfairness matters are brought under these 
circumstances. They are brought, not to second-guess the wisdom of particular 
consumer decisions, but rather to halt some form of seller behavior that 
unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to the free exercise of 
consumer decisionmaking.”273 
 
When it comes to private litigation, manipulation has not been the subject of 
many privacy cases. As Cass Sunstein notes, “Because of the pervasiveness of 
manipulation, and because it often does little or no harm, the legal system 
usually does not attempt to prevent it.”274 Spencer is also skeptical about the 
law’s ability to regulate manipulation because “it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to establish that the allegedly manipulative stimulus caused the 
consumer harm.”275 People respond very differently to manipulation, and people 
might not even realize that they are being manipulated.   
 
*  *  * 
 
As we have pointed out above, the law is lacking in coherence and consistency 
regarding the recognition of cognizable privacy harms. Courts are often failing 
to recognize privacy harms and are thwarting the enforcement of privacy 
violations or leaving them unremedied. Our typology of privacy harms aims to 
help courts better understand why each type is harmful. We also have 
endeavored to show that there are concepts in other legal contexts that could be 
applied to recognize certain types of privacy harms.   
 
III. THE CHALLENGES OF PRIVACY HARMS 
FOR THE COURTS 
 
Although better recognizing privacy harms will improve the law’s effectiveness 
at addressing privacy law violations, it is not enough. Privacy harms have a 
number of challenges that make litigating privacy cases difficult.  
 
A. PRETEXTUAL HARMS 
 
As a result of the current approach to harm, some courts locate harm in certain 
rather trivial costs or use of resources. Finding harm for these things is really a 
pretext for different types of harms that we have identified in Part II. Because 
courts require plaintiffs to allege tangible and concrete harms, complaints 
endeavor to lay out concrete harms that are not the heart of the matter at all. It is 
 
273 Federal Trade Commission, Policy Statement on Unfairness (1980), Appended to 
International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm. 
274 Sunstein, Manipulation, supra note _, at X.  
275 Spencer, Manipulation, supra note __, at 997.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782222
PRIVACY HARMS 
 43 
those harms that enable plaintiffs to get beyond motions to dismiss even though 
they are miniscule and do not capture why plaintiffs are suing. 
 
One theory that has gained some traction is that plaintiffs suffered harm in losing 
device battery life and storage space based on broken promises.276 In In re 
iPhone Application Litigation, plaintiffs alleged that Apple breached promises 
in its privacy policy to protect users’ personal data because its operating system 
readily facilitated the non-consensual collection and use of their data by apps. 
The court found that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged harm in claiming that the 
“unauthorized transmission of data from their iPhones taxed the phones’ 
resources by draining the battery and using up storage space and bandwidth.”277 
 
In Mey v. Got Warranty, Inc., the court held that unwanted calls to prepaid cell 
phones “cause direct, concrete, monetary injury by depleting limited minutes 
that the consumer has paid for” and also “deplete a cell phone’s battery, and the 
cost of electricity to recharge he phone.” The court noted that “[w]hile certainly 
small, the cost is real, and the cumulative effect could be consequential.”278 As 
another court noted, although the harm from “a single call or text (whether from 
depleted battery life, wasted time, or annoyance) would be de minimis,” the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) “is clear that a violation can occur 
from a single call.”279 As another court has noted: “Regardless of how small the 
harm is, it is actual and it is real.”280 
 
The actual harm to plaintiffs, however, is not lost storage space or slightly 
drained resources. These theories are invoked because they sound in a language 
that courts accept but not because they fit what plaintiffs suffered. The result is 
an odd sort of legal fiction, where the law redresses “harm” that is not the real 
interest interfered with as a means to redress a harm that really is.  
 
The law fails to focus on what matters most, which is whether certain practices 
cause significant problems. Lucky plaintiffs can conjure up some sort of minor 
tangible impact. But plaintiffs who can point to a severe problem that does not 
involve a negligible tangible impact are out of luck. The law perversely redresses 
trivial things rather while ignoring major problems.   
  
B. AGGREGATION OF SMALL HARMS 
 
A major complicating dimension of many privacy harms is that they are small 
but numerous. When these harms happen to an individual repeatedly by different 
actors, they become significantly more harmful. For example, receiving an 
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unwanted email is a minor inconvenience. Receiving hundreds of unwanted 
emails becomes a major imposition and distraction.   
 
Another aspect of this difficulty is that sometimes an organization will cause a 
very small amount of harm but on a very large scale – to millions or even billions 
of people. From the standpoint of each individual, the harm is minor, but from 
the standpoint of society, where the harm to everyone is aggregated, the total 
amount of harm is quite substantial.  
 
Privacy harms often involve the aggregation of many small harms to each 
individual, which is compounded by the aggregation of all these harms to many 
individuals.  The result makes privacy violations large-scale problems that cause 
a significant societal impact, but that do not fit readily into the traditional way 
the law looks at harm.   
 
FTC enforcement has successfully addressed the problem. In its policy statement 
about unfairness injury, the FTC has noted: “An injury may be sufficiently 
substantial . . . if it does a small harm to a large number of people, or if it raises 
a significant risk of concrete harm.”281  
 
However, when it comes to private litigation, for each individual, bringing a 
lawsuit for a small harm is not be worth the time or resources. Class actions are 
the predominant way to address this problem. Class actions allow for many 
people to aggregate their small harms into a single lawsuit that is large enough 
to justify the costs of litigating it.   
 
Class actions, however, are an imperfect vehicle to address privacy problems. 
Cases often quickly settle because the cost of litigating them is high. The lawyers 
often earn significant sums, maximizing their own financial interests.282 Many 
class actions become the equivalent to a shake down, with companies paying the 
lawyers to go away.   
 
If class actions do not settle, there is another problem. Companies have data on 
millions or billions of people, and even small damages can add up to enormous 
sums that can put companies out of business. These sums can become 
disproportionate to what the company did wrong. Judges are reluctant to 
recognize harm because it might mean bankrupting a company just to give each 
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C. UNKNOWABLE AND FUTURE HARMS 
 
In many cases, the harm is not fully knowable. For data breach harms, a major 
complication is that plaintiffs have not yet suffered from identity theft or fraud. 
Plaintiffs argue that they suffer harm in the form of a future risk of injury.  Courts 
are wildly inconsistent in recognizing future risk of injury as a cognizable 
harm.283  
 
Privacy harms often not only involve a future risk of injury, but they are 
compounded by an additional dimension of complexity: the range of possible 
future injuries is much more varied and could be anything in the typology of 
privacy harms that we have set forth above. To fully understand the implications 
of the collection, use, or disclosure of personal data, one must know about the 
future uses to which the data will be put. For example, if Company A improperly 
discloses personal data to Company B, the harm will depend upon what 
Company B does with the data. Company B might not immediately use the data 
in a harmful way and might not do so until after the statute of limitations. 
Company B might never use the data in a harmful way.   
 
Privacy harms are highly contextual, with the harm depending upon how the 
data is used, what data is involved, and also how the data might be combined 
with other data. Sharing an innocuous piece of data with another company might 
provide a key link to other data or allow for certain inferences to be made.  
 
Because of these difficulties, many privacy statutes use statutory damages. It is 
far easier to enforce laws with statutory damages than to try to figure out the 
harm which may involve future uses that may or may not occur. Through 
standing doctrine and cases like Spokeo, however, courts are undermining 
statutory damages provisions by forcing tired old judicial concepts of harm into 
the enforcement of these statutes. For cases not involving statutes with statutory 
damages, harm can become quite a speculative matter if there is uncertainty in 
two dimensions – the possibility of harm and the nature of harm.  
 
D. INDIVIDUAL VS. SOCIETAL HARMS 
 
Privacy harms often involve injury not just to individuals but to society. As a 
number of scholars have argued, privacy is “constitutive” of society.284 As Joel 
Reidenberg contends, [s]ociety as a whole has an important stake in the contours 
of the protection of personal information.”285 Robert Post argues that the privacy 
torts promote “rules of civility that in some significant measure constitute both 
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individuals and community.”286 According to Julie Cohen, privacy protects 
individual autonomy and creativity that are essential for society to develop a rich 
culture.287 Paul Schwartz contends that privacy is essential to democracy and 
freedom.288  
 
These considerations are often omitted from the law’s evaluation of harm  
because they do not fit the individualistic focus that courts have for cognizable 
harm. Although certain lawsuits seek mainly to vindicate individual interests, 
many group lawsuits (such as class actions) also seek to protect broader societal 
interests. Courts, however, often still fail to consider the societal impact of 
privacy harms even in these cases.  
 
IV. REALIGNING PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT 
AND REMEDIES 
 
With the law’s relentless focus on privacy harms in so many contexts that result 
in the dismissal of suits, it is easy to overlook the broader challenges afoot. 
Privacy harms are just a piece of a larger pie involving the enforcement of 
privacy law. In addition to the question of what should constitute cognizable 
privacy harm, we should also ask whether privacy harm should even be required  
in particular circumstances. In many cases, harm is irrelevant to the purposes of 
the litigation. To determine when privacy harm is an issue that should even be 
part of a case, we must answer a broader overarching question: When and how 
should privacy law be enforced?  
 
Many of the law’s difficulties with handling privacy cases are due to 
misalignments between enforcement goals and remedies. Configuring the proper 
alignment will make the law more coherent and effective.   
 
Privacy law enforcement has three predominant goals: 
 
(1) Compensation – compensating people who have been harmed 
 (2) Deterrence – preventing future violations of the law 
(3) Equity – making things right by means other than compensation 
 
Problems emerge when a remedy is misaligned with an enforcement goal. For 
example, monetary damages are a proper remedy when compensation is the 
goal. They are not a well-tailored remedy when deterrence or equity is the goal. 
The law becomes messy and riddled with problems when it tries to use the same 
remedy to address different goals. It is understandable why the law tries to do 
 
286 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law 
Tort, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 957, 959 (1989). 
287 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1373, 1428 (2000). 
288 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand. L Rev. 1609, 1613 
(1999) 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782222
PRIVACY HARMS 
 47 
this: sometimes multiple enforcement goals exist in the same case. But trying to 
use a remedy well-suited for one goal but ill-suited for another is a recipe for 
failure.  
 
An analogy can deepen our understanding of the point. A wrench is a great tool 
for unscrewing a nut. One could also try to use a wrench to hammer in a nail, 
but a wrench is a poor tool to use, as it might cause damage. The nail requires a 
hammer for its installation. The law is akin to a bad repairperson; it is constantly 
trying to use the wrong tools to achieve enforcement goals. Just because in a 
given situation there is a nut to unscrew and a nail to be hammered does not 
mean that only a wrench or a hammer should be used. Both tools should be used.   
 
This point might seem obvious, but the law almost entirely misses it. Modern 
tort law is premised on the notion that lawsuits to compensate people with 
damages can also double as a means to achieve deterrence. Of course, it is 
certainly true that compensatory damages can further the goal of deterrence, but 
this is akin to the use of the wrench to hammer in the nail – the wrench can be 
used, but it is the wrong tool, and it will not work optimally. In privacy cases, 
because of the challenging nature of privacy harms, the misfit in tools is 
exacerbated. 
 
A. THE GOALS OF ENFORCEMENT 
 
Understanding the goals of enforcement is essential to making progress toward 
the effective enforcement of privacy law. Compensation involves awarding a 
plaintiff with monetary damages to provide redress for harm wrongfully caused. 
The typical tort rule accords with this rationale by awarding damages equal to a 
victim’s loss.289 Corrective justice theory embraces an Artistotelian concept of 
justice that requires injurers to make victims whole.290 The goal is to hold actors 
responsible for losses that they wrongfully caused.291  
 
Deterrence involves imposing a penalty that deters future wrongdoing. Specific 
deterrence involves deterring wrongdoing by the particular wrongdoer against 
whom enforcement is sought. General deterrence involves deterring wrongdoing 
by other actors. The penalty imposed on a particular wrongdoer will serve as a 
lesson to teach others to avoid wrongdoing. Many organizations will only take 
laws seriously when there are likely and painful consequences for failing to 
comply.  
 
Equity involves righting wrongs in situations where compensation is not an 
adequate way of addressing them. Equitable remedies aim to restore things to 
their original state before the wrongdoing or to help fix situations where 
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damages will not. The law has a number of equitable remedies, such as 
injunctions and specific performance. 
 
B. ALIGNING REMEDIES WITH GOALS 
 
1. The Problem of Misalignment 
 
The law suffers when it fails to align appropriate remedies with enforcement 
goals. When compensation is the enforcement goal, compensatory damages are 
the appropriate remedy, and these damages are based on harm. When deterrence 
is the enforcement goal, private rights of action enable “private attorneys 
general” to enforce a law. Compensatory damages are a misfit in many cases 
unless there is harm. The remedy should be an amount that provides optimal 
general and specific deterrence. When equity is the enforcement goal, 
appropriate equitable remedies should be used. Harm should not be required. 
The main issue should be whether there is a problem that can be fixed or 
ameliorated with legal intervention.   
 
Tort law attempts to achieve both the goal of compensation and deterrence 
simultaneously. This attempt to do both might seem efficient, but the goals are 
quite different. For example, when lawsuits are tied to compensatory damages, 
the existence of liability insurance can complicate the goal of deterrence. When 
the magnitude of the defendant’s insurance premiums does not track the 
magnitude of the defendant’s liabilities, the threat of liability may fall short of 
promoting optimal deterrence because the defendant can externalize the risk of 
liability through the purchase of insurance.292  
 
On the flip side, liability for compensatory damages can be far greater than is 
optimal for deterrence. Compensation even for very small harms can become 
outsized if multiplied by millions of people. Deterrence is the more meaningful 
goal, and compensation in these instances might be counterproductive. For 
example, providing a few cents to a billion individuals might do little for their 
social welfare, but could put companies out of business. It might result in over-
deterrence, leading companies to abandon socially beneficial personal data 
practices.  
 
In many instances, private litigation is used primarily as a vehicle to achieve 
deterrence. Legislatures often include a private right of action in statutes so that 
plaintiffs acting as “private attorneys general” will help enforce the law. The 
goal is to increase enforcement to deter violations.  The use of the private right 
of action for compensation is a secondary goal or a goal in only a small number 
of cases. As the Illinois Supreme Court noted in Rosenbach v. Six Flags 
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Entertainment Corporation regarding the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy 
Act (BIPA), harm is not a requirement of the statute, and the legislature included 
the private right of action not just to compensate plaintiffs but because it “is as 
integral to implementation of the legislature’s objectives” to deter BIPA 
violations.293  
 
Sone courts, however, miss the point about private attorneys general. For 
example, in Stoops v. Wells Fargo, plaintiff Melody Stoops bought 35 cell 
phones to try to ensnare companies that made telemarketing calls in violation of 
the TCPA. The TCPA provides penalties of $500 for each violation with 
penalties trebled for willful or knowing violations.294 The court dismissed her 
case for lack of harm: “Plaintiff’s privacy interests were not violated when she 
received calls from Defendant. . .  Because Plaintiff has admitted that her only 
purpose in using her cell phones is to file TCPA lawsuits, the calls are not ‘a 
nuisance and an invasion of privacy.’”295 According to the court, “Plaintiff has 
not suffered an injury-in-fact because her privacy and economic interests were 
not violated when she received calls from Defendant.” The court reasoned that 
“it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit” and 
that “it is unfathomable that Congress considered a consumer who files TCPA 
actions as a business when it enacted the TCPA.”296  
 
Stoops may have been opportunistic, but her motives does not negate the harm 
inflicted upon her. Trying to catch a wrongdoer does not mean that one is 
unharmed by the wrongdoer’s actions in the process. Ultimately, however, harm 
should not be relevant to the Stoops case. Congress wrote the private right of 
action under the TCPA without a requirement of harm. Deterrence is the goal, 
not compensation. The fact that lawyers and plaintiffs benefit financially from 
enforcing privacy laws is a necessary side effect of private rights of 
action. Litigation must be sufficiently remunerative to incentivize private 
enforcement.  
 
Contrary to the court’s view of Stoops, she was engaging in desirable 
enforcement of the TCPA, catching violators when enforcement agencies were 
not. The main benefit of a private right of action in a law is to encourage private 
enforcement of that law.  Because government agencies often lack the resources 
to enforce a law rigorously and consistently enough.   
 
2. An Approach for Realignment 
 
In privacy cases, how should the law better align the goals of enforcement with 
remedies? When should harm be required? We contend that harm should be an 
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issue only in cases where the enforcement goal is compensation. In many 
instances of privacy litigation, the enforcement goals involve deterrence and 
equity, not compensation. For these cases, harm is irrelevant. The amount of 
damages in such cases should be tailored to the enforcement goal. When the goal 
is deterrence, attempting to conjure up some amount of compensation (often 
based on pretext) will not be optimal for achieving this goal. The issue of harm 
just gets in the way and muddies the waters when the essential issue is clear: 
What amount of damages would be optimal for deterrence? For cases where 
equity is the goal, non-monetary remedies should be imposed. Redressing harm 
can certainly be one of the aims of equity, but goals of equity extend far beyond 
traditional conceptions of harm. Equity is a way to right wrongs, not just remedy 
harms.  
 
More specifically, we propose the following approach: First, courts should 
require harm in tort actions brought to secure compensation. Establishing harm 
should be restricted only to the ability to obtain compensatory damages. Other 
relief, such as equitable relief, should not turn on harm.    
 
Second, for contract cases, courts should enforce the contract. Courts should use 
remedies, such as specific enforcement, restitution, or recission. Attorneys fees 
and some modest damages should be paid to compensate for the time and hassle 
of having to litigate to make the defendant adhere to the contract.  
 
Third, courts should not inject harm into cases involving statutes with private 
rights of action. Modern standing doctrine has strayed too far from the 
Constitutional requirement of “cases” or “controversies” to shut the doors to the 
courts to many cases that should be heard. Standing has become a conceptual 
mess, with courts spending too much time questioning harm and losing sight of 
the important issues.   
 
Standing doctrine is a significant impediment to the coherent operation of 
privacy laws. Standing forces harm into cases where it should not be. Spokeo is 
part of a lineage of Supreme Court cases that shifted to a harms-based approach 
as a mechanism to shut off courts as a means for achieving social justice.  
According to Cass Sunstein, modern standing doctrine is an attack on the 
enforceability of much modern regulation: “[T]he very notion of ‘injury in fact’ 
is not merely a misinterpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act and 
Article III but also a large-scale conceptual mistake.”297 Sunstein argues that the 
injury-in-fact requirement “injects common law conceptions of harm into the 
Constitution.”298 It purports to be a “purely factual inquiry” but is “inevitably a 
product of courts' value-laden judgments.”299  
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Likewise, Felix Wu argues that “standing law seems to be serving no purpose 
other than to constitutionalize a deregulatory agenda.”300 “Until recently,” Wu 
observes, “tangibility and other questions about the quality of the harm suffered 
by the plaintiff simply were not part of the Supreme Court's standing analysis. 
Lower courts nevertheless incorporated such considerations into their analyses 
of standing in privacy cases. The Supreme Court has now done the same, thus 
shifting the law on standing, while professing that nothing has changed.”301 As 
Rachel Bayefsky notes, before the shift in standing doctrine, instead of requiring 
harm, courts required merely a “legal right” to bring a lawsuit based on property, 
contract, tort, or statute.302  
 
Spokeo’s invitation to courts to look to historically recognized harms in the 
common law further ossifies the common law’s protection of privacy beyond  
the ossification caused by Prosser.303 Warren and Brandeis aimed to generate 
new causes of action to rise to the problems; ossification contravenes the very 
spirt of their article. For Warren and Brandeis, the common law looks not just 
backwards but forwards as well. The common law is progressive, not regressive.  
 
The requirement of harm in standing that overrides private rights of action in 
laws invites judicial overreaching. Courts should approach statutory private 
rights of action with more humility. Legislatures do not provide private rights of 
action loosely. Private rights of action are one of the most contested elements of 
laws, and when legislatures deem that violations of a law require the recognition 
of private rights of action, judges ought to show more respect for the legislature’s 
determination. 
 
Nullifying this enforcement component of the law can thwart the way the law is 
supposed to work. When Congress passes statutes, it will sometimes preempt 
state laws on the same issue, so plaintiffs might be barred from suing in state 
court for state law violations. Preemption is a kind of bargain, where plaintiffs 
might lose out on pursuing actions in state court but will be allowed instead to 
pursue actions in federal court based on the federal statute. This is how FCRA 
works, as it preempts certain state laws and directs plaintiffs to sue under its 
provisions.304 By requiring harm, courts pull the rug out from that bargain, 
leaving plaintiffs with nowhere to pursue their cases.  
 
Congress weighs various enforcement mechanisms from agency enforcement to 
state attorney general enforcement to private rights of action. Many statutes have 
a mix of different types of enforcement, presumably because it is Congress’s 
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judgment about the efficacy of a particular enforcement mix. When courts 
nullify a component of Congress’s enforcement mix, this can throw off the 
statutory recipe in ways that Congress did not anticipate.   
 
Focusing on individual harm for these latter types of lawsuits is missing the point 
and actual purpose of the lawsuit. Many class action lawsuits would not be worth 
the significant costs if their sole benefit were to compensate individuals for any 
harm. For many class action lawsuits, the amount of compensation individuals 
receive is trivial. If this were the main benefit of these lawsuits, then we ought 
to reconsider whether they are worth the costs. The real value of many class 
action lawsuits is in holding defendants accountable for their wrongdoing when 
the harm is of a nature that is small and dispersed.  
 
The law must break away from the rigid formalistic approach that anytime there 
is even a very small harm, it warrants compensatory damages. The law should 
also eschew its rigidity in dismissing cases when there is no cognizable harm. 
The rigidity makes litigation fit quite poorly with enforcement goals.   
 
In class action cases where there may be only a small harm to individuals, courts 
should be able to fashion a remedy without resorting to compensatory damages. 
Compensatory damages for large classes could end up adding to an excessive 
sum beyond that necessary to achieve the optimal deterrence. A miniscule 
amount of damages for each class member will not address the goal of 
compensation in a meaningful way. In such a situation, the enforcement goal is 
the meaningful one, and this goal should be the driver of the appropriate remedy.   
 
In other cases, the amount of compensatory damages might be too low for 
optimal enforcement. If the compensation to the class is minimal, then 
compensatory damages are not a meaningful remedy, and courts should be able 
to fashion a more appropriate remedy with punitive damages or equitable relief.  
 
To avoid unnecessary class action lawsuits, in statutory cases where only 
deterrence is a goal, and compensation is not involved, courts might be given 
the option of evaluating the extent to which the statute has already been 
enforced. If a regulatory agency has already enforced a law effectively for the 
violation, then the statute might have a requirement for establishing harm, as the 
only goal of a lawsuit under these circumstances would be compensation. 
Legislatures could write laws to permit courts to dismiss lawsuits in situations 
where regulatory enforcement has been sufficient for deterrence and other 
enforcement goals are not present.   
 
  





A well-calibrated legal response to privacy cases would permit socially 
beneficial personal data practices while requiring robust protections for the 
handling of personal data. Its primary focus should be on the deterrence of 
violations with the goal of encouraging widespread compliance. Compensation 
is important for individuals who have suffered significant harm. 
 
Legal intervention should be designed to ensure that socially beneficial 
information practices continue. Our economy depends upon the collection and 
sharing of personal data. At the same time, personal data practices are inherently 
risky. Privacy law aims to ensure that personal data is used properly, that 
individuals have the ability to make decisions about their personal data, that 
there are meaningful guardrails and boundaries about how data is collected, 
used, or disclosed.  
 
But struggles with recognizing cognizable privacy harms have impeded the 
law’s effectiveness. Crabbed conceptions of harm have led courts to dismiss 
cases that are a key lynchpin for privacy law enforcement.  
 
The common law as well as litigation of private rights of action have much to 
contribute to the development of privacy regulation. The common law remains 
underdeveloped. There are many helpful concepts in the common law that can 
advance privacy protection in a useful way. Although currently, the common 
law privacy has failed to develop adequate protections of privacy in the digital 
age, the common law could certainly do so in the future. The common law has 
doctrines, concepts, and remedies that could be very effective tools for privacy 
law. 
 
Private litigation can play a major role in effective privacy law enforcement, and 
there are foundations in the law for it to develop in productive ways. For 
example, one of us has contended that strict liability has been underutilized in 
privacy cases.305 Strict liability obviates proving fault, and the vast repositories 
of personal data that are being maintained about people can be analogized to the 
ultrahazardous activities of the Industrial Age. Lauren Scholz argues that 
restitution is a viable remedy for many privacy violations.306 Restitution 
involves returning back benefits that unjustly enriched a defendant. Scholz also 
recommends that “[g]iven the cramped nature of the privacy torts, a better 
avenue for tort law for data trafficking lies in torts related to wrongful business 
practices. This family of torts has the aim of promoting basic fair play in 
commerce.”307 Scholars have recommended developing the protections of 
fiduciary relationships to apply to companies that process personal data, 
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including one of the authors of this article.308 Moreover, various federal statutes 
lacking a private right of action can still serve as the basis for the standard of 
care in common law tort actions, such as UDAP laws, negligence, breach of 
confidentiality, and others.309 
 
The requirement of harm has been a significant impediment to the law’s 
development. The rigid clinging to an approach where enforcement goals and 
remedies are misaligned results in cases that lead to poor outcomes. With the 
proper alignment, a broader recognition of privacy harms, a better understanding 
of privacy problems, and a more flexible approach, the law can more effectively 
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